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Introduction 
According to Colonel and Professor of Military Geography, Eugene Palka’s, 
Modern Military Geography “Military Geography is the application of geographic 
information, tools, and techniques to military problems.”1 Historically, military 
geography has been applied primarily to decisive battles or wars, limiting the scope of its 
effectiveness. Recently, geographers have extended geographic analysis and principles to 
unconventional military scenarios. Many geography scholars advocate analysis of 
geography to support peacetime and support operations. This paper will push this 
proposition even farther to suggest retroactive geographic analysis of conflict zones.  
 Geography and military geography can be divided into the subfields of Physical 
and Human Geography. Physical Geography examines the physical make up of an area 
including its climate, topography, land forms, soil content, location, and borders. Human 
Geography focuses on groupings of different cultural characteristics within an area. 
Geography is a constant in the world, it may change over time, but its impact is always 
present. What is called into question is whether or not that impact is as consistent as the 
geography it derives from; especially its impact on conflict. Afghanistan provides an 
opportunity to test this question.  
 Afghanistan has been in almost a constant state of conflict since the Soviet 
Invasion of 1979. The conflict in Afghanistan, while continuous, has varied in 
participation, combatants, casualties, intensities, and destructiveness. The Soviet Invasion 
and Occupation was followed by the Afghan Civil War, which was in turn, followed by 
                                                          
1 Galgano, Francis A. Modern Military Geography. New York: Routledge, 2011. 
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the Coalition invasion of Afghanistan as a part of Operation Enduring Freedom. While 
the three conflicts vary considerably, the Soviet Invasion and Operation Enduring 
Freedom share common themes that make them the most comparable. This paper will use 
the geography of Afghanistan to identify the commonalities of these two conflicts, but the 
complex geography of Afghanistan makes this task difficult. 
 The USSR invaded Afghanistan after decades of political intervention throughout 
the early 20th century. The Soviet Empire spread its influence until it met a true imperial 
competitor. The British Empire and the successor to the Russian Empire finally came 
face to face in the “Great Game in Afghanistan. Facing the influence of the two huge 
imperial powers, Afghans eventually pushed both of them out of their country and 
became an independent nation state in 1919. After the expulsion of the British, the USSR 
saw Afghanistan as a place where communism would take hold or at least allow them to 
create a buffer state to shield the USSR from other powers.  The USSR supported an 
overthrow of the Afghanistan monarchy in 1973, was soon frustrated by Afghan 
nationalists who would not bend to their will. The Soviets invaded in 1979 to install a 
government that would not only be procommunist, but also pro-Soviet.2 
Tradition in Afghanistan was to resist any alien presence in Afghanistan. In the 
Soviet War the Mujihadeen resistance rose to combat the foreign presence. The 
Mujihadeen, meaning holy warrior, consisted of many different ethnic and language 
groups. The Afghani resistance eventually proved strong enough to drive the Soviets out 
                                                          
2 Larry P. Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the 
Taliban (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), 264.                                                                                               
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of the country. Soviet troops vacated the country in 1989 leaving their puppet 
administration at the hands of the resistance.3 
 The last remnants of the Soviet government collapsed in 1992 and was replaced 
by the Taliban, a largely Pashtun group organized by religious scholars from southeastern 
Afghanistan. The Taliban was never able to exercise control over the entire country. 
After its rise to power, groups of Tajiks, Uzbeks, and even some Pashtun formed the 
Northern Alliance in the region north of the Hindu Kush. They opposed the Taliban and 
its strict adherence to Sharia law in the Afghan Civil War. While combatting the 
Northern Alliance, the Taliban allowed al Qaeda, a largely Arab terrorist network focused 
on global jihad, to take up residence in the country. After al Qaeda, under the leadership 
of Osama bin Laden, conducted the terrorist attack in New York City on September 11th, 
2001 the fate of Afghanistan drastically shifted.  
 Up to this point, Afghanistan was largely ignored on the global stage, but in 2001 
the world focused on the central Asian country. A “coalition of the willing” was formed 
and quickly invaded the country as a part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The 
Taliban was removed from power and went into hiding. A provisional government was 
formed by the largely American Coalition while international troops remained in the 
country to eradicate the remnants of the Taliban and al Qaeda. The coalition forces united 
with the former Northern Alliance and began building an Afghanistan National Army to 
unite the Afghanistan population against the insurgency. While this mission has not been 
                                                          
3 Anthony Arnold, Afghanistan, the Soviet Invasion in Perspective, Rev an enl ed., Vol. 321 (Stanford, 
Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1985), 179.                                                                                                
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completed, the original contributors to OEF are committed to removing all of their 
personnel, other than support staff, from the country by 2014.   
 The three conflicts: Soviet Invasion, Civil War, and Operation Enduring Freedom, 
were conducted under completely different technological, economic, and logistical 
conditions. The Soviet invasion was an imperial invasion opposed by rebel forces with 
strong foreign support. The Civil War was almost devoid of other state actors, but the 
current conflict in Afghanistan differs only slightly from the Soviet Invasion in the 20th 
Century. The American coalition has been working in conjunction with many different 
groups of Afghanis, while the Soviets combatted the Mujihadeen largely on their own. 
And, unlike with the Soviet invasion, public opinion polls show that a majority of 
Afghanis supported the overthrow of the Taliban, even if they disagree with the current 
actions or presence of the United States and its allies in Afghanistan.4  
  How does Afghanistan’s geography come into play with these three different 
conflicts? Does Afghanistan’s unique physical geography play a large role in the 
outcomes of conflict or is Afghanistan’s incredibly diverse Cultural Geography more 
effective? These are the questions that may be answered using spatial analysis of conflict 
data in relation to Afghanistan’s geographic features.  
 Determining the answer to these questions is a bold endeavor, but it is useful, 
even if only on a large and generalized scale. During the Soviet Occupation of 
Afghanistan, the Institute for Strategic Studies, a non-profit organization devoted to 
analyzing open source intelligence in Islamabad, Pakistan published monthly reports of 
                                                          
4 Nick Hynek and Péter Marton, State building in Afghanistan: Multinational Contributions to 
Reconstruction (Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2011), 285.                                                                                             
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the conflict in Afghanistan. These reports counted the number of violent incidents in each 
province every month and recorded who initiated the conflict and who provided the 
information. The “Afghanistan Reports” also recorded how many Afghan citizens 
repatriated to their provinces from other areas during the occupation. The spatial data 
provided by the “Afghanistan Reports” is restricted to the provincial level, rather than 
districts or precise coordinates. However, the summaries for each province provide 
information about trends within the provinces regarding refugees, mobile versus 
immobile targets, and the initiation of conflict. Spatial data for the Soviet War was not 
recorded consistently or precisely due to difficulty of collection, but that collected during 
Operation Enduring Freedom is more detailed and precise.5  
Most of this data was not intentionally made available to the public. Wikileaks, an 
international online organization that publishes secret information from anonymous 
sources, published the “Afghanistan War Diary” (AWD) in 2010. The AWD contained 
US military communications. According to this Wikileaks publication, each report in the 
AWD attempts to answer the questions of “Who, When, Where, What, with whom, by 
what Means and Why” for each violent incident reported on. The AWD provides spatial 
information down to the exact location of each event. For this analysis, “Where” is not 
the only important information. Geography is touched by all of these questions, but will 
focus on “Who” and “Where” for this paper to address the two sub fields of Human and 
Physical Geography.6  
                                                          
5 "Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad."http://www.issi.org.pk/aboutus.php?id=52014).                                             
6 WikiLeaks, "Afghanistan War Diary" 2010. 
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The AWD, unlike the “Afghanistan Reports,” is not limited to information on a 
provincial level. Instead, the AWD provides geographic information in the terms of 
latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates, and region. With this relatively precise 
information, and other information available about Afghanistan’s geography, it is 
possible to look for trends among the tens of thousands of violent events that took place 
in Afghanistan from 2005-2009. This can be done by correlating these conflict points 
with the country’s various geographic features, including but not limited to its cities, 
roads, waterways, language groups, and ethnic divisions.  
Around 50% of the engagements for both the Soviet Conflict and Operation 
Enduring Freedom occurred in a relatively small area. For the Soviet Conflict, 50% took 
place in 5 out of the 29 provinces in Afghanistan: Nangarhar, Qandahar, Kabul, Paktia, 
and Parwan. During Operation Enduring Freedom, 49% of the violence occurred in 3 out 
of the 34 provinces: Qandahar, Helmand, and Kunar. Why would half of the incidents 
during these conflicts occur in such a relatively small area? Using the conflict data from 
the “Afghanistan Reports” and AWD for each conflict and other geographic data from a 
myriad of sources, it can be determined which geographic features effect most of these 
conflict hotspots or whether there are no trends at all.7  
Identifying trends in these two conflicts is difficult enough, but there is no danger 
of misidentifying one prominent geographic feature as a trend, because it does not appear 
that any one geographic feature, be it physical or cultural, dominated the two conflicts. 
Instead it appears that the provinces containing a high percentage of the recorded 
                                                          
7 WikiLeaks, "Afghanistan War Diary" 2010).  “Afghanistan Report (Islamabad, Pakistan: Islamabad 
Institute for Security Studies, [1984-1987]).                                             
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engagements are geographically distinct from the provinces around them. This is not a 
statement of a tendency or trend, instead it is a statement of fact. The data from these two 
sources proves that areas with high levels of conflict are geographically distinct from the 
provinces around them. However, identifying a province as “geographically distinct” 
does not say much. The distinctions that will be highlighted here are those that push their 
provinces into the geographic extreme. For example, these “geographic extremes” consist 
of provinces that are 100% mountainous rather than others that are 90% mountainous or 
provinces that 92% agricultural rather than 80%. And while analysis is confined to the 
provincial level during the Soviet Invasion due to lack of data, this is not the case during 
OEF.  
For OEF, data is available on a more precise level and allows for not only analysis 
of conflict location to specific geographic features, but also on a district level, the 
administrative boundaries smaller than provinces. By determining the districts within 
each of the provinces that experience the most violent engagements, it can be determined 
whether or not of these province’s extreme geographic feature is prevalent in the areas 
actually the experiencing violence. For example, this method is able to show that not only 
is a highly violent province heavily irrigated, but the violence taking place is actually 
taking place in those irrigated areas.  Unfortunately, because this same method cannot be 
applied to the Soviet Conflict and the districts existing at that time, it can only be used to 
support the claims made for half of the analyzed incidents. 
While it is difficult to prove definite trends with this limited data, it can be shown 
that during these two similar conflicts, the provinces that experienced the most violence 
10 
 
had a geographic trait making them more conducive to conflict. Identifying these features 
should make it possible to better predict future trends of conflict.  
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Chapter 1: Geographic Survey 
Afghanistan is highly diverse in respect to geography. The physical and human 
geography differs greatly throughout the country. This chapter will explore this 
geography to provide background and context to the historical narrative that will be 
presented in Chapter 2.  
Afghanistan is a landlocked country located in Central Asia. It borders six 
countries: Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and China. Its longest 
border is shared with Pakistan, but it maintains strong cultural ties to Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Afghanistan’s geographic connection to China is the weakest 
of any of its neighbors. Their shared border is the shortest and the cross border cultural 
ties are almost nonexistent.8  
Within the country itself, there are three distinct physical regions. The Central 
Highlands, the Northern Plains, and the Southwestern Plateau. The Highlands is the 
largest region of Afghanistan, covering about 70% of the territory. It contains the Hindu 
Kush mountain range that spread from the Eastern most area of the country to the 
Southwest. The mountains Hindu Kush grow taller and taller the father you get into the 
country. The mountains serve as a dividing line for the two other regions of the country.9  
North of the mountains are the Northern Plains. Taking up 15% of Afghanistan’s 
land area, it is the most agriculturally rich region of the country. The Southwestern 
Plateau is a slight misnomer, because it is not confined to the Southwestern area of the 
country. Instead the Southwestern Plateau includes all regions that are not the Highlands 
                                                          
8 Eugene J. Palka, Geographic Perspectives: Afghanistan (Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2004), 
104.                                                                                     
9 Ibid 
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or the Plains. These infertile areas include the Herat-Ferah lowlands in the Northwest, the 
Helmand River valley in the Southwest, and the Rigestan Desert in the South. The 
Helmand River Valley is the only fertile area on the Southwestern Plateau. The varying 
fertility and climates in the three regions create three distinct types of vegetation in each 
region.10 
In the Highlands temperatures are too low to support any kind of consistent 
growth. The very east of the Highlands contains Afghanistan’s only forest composed of 
trees and plants of all kinds. Trees such as spruce, pine, and fir are plentiful in this 
temperate oasis. Smaller plants and bushes yield many types of nuts and berries. In the 
Southwestern Plateau, the Helmand River and associated irrigation enable Afghanis to 
grow wheat, maize, cotton, and barley. The Helmand River Valley is one of the two main 
agriculture centers in the state. The Northern Plains, the second agriculture center is 
known for its very fertile soil. Rainfall is as scarce here as it is in the rest of the country, 
but irrigation and the Amu Dar’ya river enables the Plains region to produce and 
abundance of fruit and vegetable crops while the South focuses on grain and commercial 
crop production.11 A main cause of this crop diversity is the varying temperatures through 
the country. 
Average temperature varies greatly across the nation from the peaks of the Hindu 
Kush to the lowlands. During the summer temperatures in the lowlands can rise over 38 
C every day, while areas of the Central highlands average temperatures closer to 10 C. 
During the winter, temperatures average -10 C in the highlands, but remain around 
positive 10 C in the lowlands. Afghanistan lacks large bodies of water (oceans or lakes) 
                                                          
10 Ibid 
11 Ibid 
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that could influence its average temperatures, and the low specific heat of the earth 
causes drastic differences between not only summer and winter temperatures but also 
those of day and night.12 
The Hindu Kush Mountains divide the country into three separate zones and make it very 
difficult to travel between the regions due to the mountains divide in between them. The 
Primary Highway of Afghanistan is known as the Ring Road or Highway 1. IT stretches 
from Kabul to Kandahar to Herat to Maar-e-Sharif back to Kabul.  This road serves as the 
primary means of transportation across the country. Originally constructed in the 1960s 
the road was heavily damaged in the Soviet Invasion. Reconstruction of the road became 
a core objective of the U.S. “hearts and minds” strategy. After rapid reconstruction, the 
Ring Road was officially reopened in 2003. Other road networks exist in the country but 
all lack the long term quality of Highway 1 and consists mainly of dirt tracks and 
mountain paths. The mountain road network has not been paved and a majority of 
mountain roads are not wide enough to accommodate modern vehicles.13 
  Traveling from one side of the mountains to the other, especially north/south 
through the Hindu Kush, can be incredibly tricky. The Salang Pass, which is now 
complemented by the Salang Tunnel, is the main route from Southern Afghanistan to the 
North Plains. Located north of Kabul, it has been a strategic point in all military 
operations in Afghanistan. Without the Salang Tunnel, the only roads connecting Kabul 
to northern Afghanistan would have to pass through Pakistan. Tense relations with 
Pakistan make this option more and more unreliable. Pakistan and Afghanistan are also 
                                                          
12 Ibid C-5, Figures 12.6 
13 "Asian Development Bank: Afghanistan 'Ring Road's' Missing Link to be constructed." M2 Presswire (-
10-03, 2007), 1.                                             
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divided by a mountain range. The Khyber Pass is the easiest route between the two 
countries and is currently in control of Pakistan. 14  
Until the past decade, roads were the only transportation means in the country. 
The rivers are not necessarily navigable and railroads did not exist. Only recent 
infrastructure projects follow the U.S. invasion in 2001 have begun railway construction. 
China is currently constructing a railroad to export minerals through Pakistan and Iran 
has constructed a rail between Kwacha and Herat in western Afghanistan. A rail line is 
also being constructed along the leg of the Ring Road from Mazar-e-Sherif to Termez at 
the Uzbek border. The physical diversity of Afghanistan distinguishes it from all other 
nations, but it is in the human geography that Afghanistan proves its true diversity.15  
According to the United Nations, there are over 40 native languages in 
Afghanistan. These groups’ different language groups serve to simultaneously divide and 
unite the country by cutting it off from other nations, but also creating deep divisions 
between the different groups within the country. The only common language for the 
whole country is Arabic. Arabic is the primary language of Islam. The teachings of Allah 
were passed to the Prophet Mohammed in Arabic, and to study the Qur’an in its purest 
form, it must be done in Arabic. All worship services are held in Arabic, but once those 
services, end, few continue to speak Arabic in their daily lives. Even though Arabic is 
widely known in Afghanistan, it is not one of the country’s two national languages.16  
Pashto and Dari are the two official languages. Pashto is the language of the 
Pashtun people, the majority ethnic group in the country. However, despite that fact, it is 
                                                          
14 Ibid. 
15 Palka, Geographic Perspectives: Afghanistan (Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2004), 104.                                              
16 Ibid 
15 
 
the not the most wide spoken of the two. Pashto is an Indo-European language spoken by 
35% of the population all primarily from the Pashtun ethnicity. Dari, the other official 
language of Afghanistan, is not confined to a single ethnic group. Tajiks, Hazara, and 
Aimaq peoples are all primarily Dari speakers, and together outnumber the Pashto 
speakers. While these are the primary languages spoken in Afghanistan, smaller language 
groups remain significant.17 
Nuristani, another Indo-European language, is spoken exclusively by a small 
ethnic group of the same name. The language, like the ethnic group, is sometimes 
referred to as Karifi meaning infidel or non-believer because the people were one of the 
largest non-Muslim groups in the country until a recent forced conversion. The Turkik 
ethnic groups of the north and far western regions of the country all speaker different 
dialects of Turkik languages. The Turkmen, Uzbek, and Kyrgyz people all speak 
mutually unintelligible dialects that fall under this umbrella. The Baloch people of 
southern Afghanistan speak their own Kurdish dialect, and the Brahui speak a Dravidian 
dialect that is derived from Tamil. Not only are these dialects unintelligible to each other, 
they come from completely different linguistic families. The language barriers within 
Afghanistan contribute to a greater socio-diversity detract from the concept of Afghan 
nationalism.18 
Afghan nationalism may not be consistent, but strong identification with your 
personal ethnic group is very common in Afghanistan. The country is composed of many 
                                                          
17 Olaf Caroe, "The Pathans," Asian Review 57 (-01-01, 1961), 3-17.                                             
18 Julius Cavendish, "First, Take Nuristan: The Taliban's New Afghan Plan, Time2011” Palka, Geographic 
Perspectives: Afghanistan (Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2004), 104.                                             
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ethnic groups of varying ancestries, languages, and traditions. The differences between 
these groups have often been assumed to be a primary reason for prolonged conflict in 
the region. These ethnic groups are not confined by political boundaries on the provincial 
or national level. As such, these ethnic groups are a large part of the connection between 
Afghanistan and its neighbors.19 
The Pashtun are the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan and have dominated it 
politically and culturally since the 18th Century. Both the Taliban and PDPA were 
composed primarily of ethnic Pashtuns. Before the creation of the Afghani nation-state, 
the Pashtun were referred to simply as Afghanis. The Pashtun traditionally live in a large 
swatch of territory on the southern side of the Hindu Kush spanning from Pakistan to 
Iraq.20  
The larger Pashtun group, composed of almost 17 million people, can be divided 
into smaller segments. First, there are the three main groups of Pashtun Afghanis. The 
first is the Durrani Pashtun. The Durrani tribes are sedentary, residing mostly in the South 
of Afghanistan, north of Kandahar. The Durrani have been the dominant tribe of Pashtun 
for hundreds of years, providing the ruling class from 1749-1978. Apart from the Durrani 
is the Ghilzai tribes that are primarily nomadic in the eastern part of the country. All 
Pashtun that do not belong to the Durrani or Ghilzai do not identify as part of a larger 
cultural group.21  
                                                          
19 Caroe, The Pathans, Vol. 57, 1961), 3-17.                                             
20 A. Giustozzi, "Ethnic Groups and Political Mobilization in Afghanistan," Revista De Estudios Sociales 
(Bogotá, Colombia), no. 37 (-12-01, 2010), 30-45.                                             
21 Palka, Geographic Perspectives: Afghanistan (Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2004), 104.                                              
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All Pashtun tribes (Durrani, Ghilzai, or non-identifying) associate with a khel, or 
subtribe. These subtribes are not as significant as the next cultural subunit, the khol. The 
khol is made up of one’s extended family and other local clans. Pashtun rarely identify as 
a part of the larger ethnic group. Instead allegiance stops at the tribal level. Durrani 
Pashtun do not feel connect or obligated to Ghilzai or members of other tribes. These 
divisions have prevented the Pashtun from effectively controlling the nation. They are 
unable to soothe tensions among their own ethnicity let alone with other groups.22 
One unifying trait of the Pashtun is their religion. The Pashtun are primarily Sunni 
Muslims. They are believed to be more conservative relative to Afghani Sunni from other 
ethnic groups. Apart from the unifying presence of Islam, the Pashtun people are united 
by the Pashtunwali, the Pashtun code of conduct. This code is extensive, having been 
compiled from many different tribal codes, but has overarching themes. These include: 
1. Hospitality to guests 
2. Right to asylum 
3. Blood revenge 
4. Bravery 
5. Manhood 
6. Persistence 
7. Steadfastness 
8. Righteousness 
9. Defense of property 
                                                          
22 Giustozzi, "Ethnic Groups and Political Mobilization in Afghanistan." Decanatura de la Facultad de 
Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de los Andes, 2010), 30-45.                                             
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10. Defense of the honor of Women23 
Due to the historic Pashtun dominance of the Afghan government, the Pashtunwali had a 
significant influence on the development of the Afghanistan legal code prior to the Soviet 
invasion. After the rise of the Taliban, the relevance of the Pashtunwali to the secular 
legal system is even clearer. Along with the specific laws, the traditional Pashtun method 
of governance has had a significant impact on Afghanistan. The smaller Afghani clan is 
governed by a Jirga, or tribal assembly. According to Syed Abdule Quddus, author of 
The Pathans, an in-depth look into Pashtun culture in Pakistan, the Jirga system is the 
closest thing the modern world has to Athenian Democracy. The Jirga system would later 
be used to form the Loya Jirgas that appointed Karzai and write the new Constitution in 
2003.24 
Tajiks are the second largest ethnic group in Afghanistan. They are divided up 
throughout the country, but are not as culturally fragmented as the Pashtun. Tajiks are 
Dari speaking Sunni Muslims. Tajiks also have very close ties to the Tajik majority 
nation of Tajikistan. Tajiks are located in both the northeastern part of Afghanistan as 
well as in pockets of the central and western regions.25 
Tajiks played an important role in the opposition to the Taliban and were a vital 
part of the Northern Alliance. In recent years, Afghani Tajiks have believed it as their 
                                                          
23 Caroe, The Pathans, Vol. 57, 1961), 3-17.                                             
24 Caroe, The Pathans, Vol. 57, 1961), 3-17.                                             
25 Palka, Geographic Perspectives: Afghanistan (Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2004), 104.                                              
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time to take control of the country. Tajiks make up about 25% of the population of 
Afghanistan, but share a language with more than 50%.26 
The Hazara are the third largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, making up slightly 
less than 10% of the country’s population. They are primarily a pastoral people living in 
the central region of Afghanistan known as the Hazarijat. The primary language of the 
Hazara is Dari, similar to the Tajiks. Just as the Pashtun have ruled Afghanistan for 200 
years, the Hazara have been politically dominated for this amount of time.27 
Traditionally the Hazara have very little say in government or politics. Hazara as 
a whole are traditionally under-educated and work the jobs lowest on the rungs of the 
social ladder. Hazara are farmers and shepherds in the central highlands. The harsh 
climate of the high lands does not make it easy to live a subsistence lifestyle, but the 
Hazara have managed for centuries.28  
Despite a linguistic commonality with the Dari speaking Tajiks, most of the 
Hazara are Shi’ite Muslims. This difference distinguishes them as even more of a 
minority in Afghanistan. The Tajiks also lack the numbers to compete with the Pashtun, 
but their religious beliefs give them a common ground uniting them as a dominating 
Sunni force that the Hazara have no hope to outpace.29 
                                                          
26 Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), 264.                                              
27 Giustozzi, Ethnic Groups and Political Mobilization in Afghanistan.” Decanatura de la Facultad de 
Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de los Andes, 2010), 30-45.”                                             
28 Ibid 
29 Klaus Ferdinand, "Ethnographical Notes on Chahar Aimaq, Hazara and Moghol," Acta Orientalia 
(København) 28 (-01-01, 1964), 175-203.; Grant Farr, "Hazara," in Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle 
East and North Africa, ed. Philip Mattar, 2nd ed. ed., Vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2004), 
1014-1015.                                             
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The Hazara have been persecuted by the Pashtun for centuries. This persecution is 
traditionally attributed to the Sunnite/Shi’ite divide, but some maintain that this 
persecution was present before the introduction of Islam into Central Asia. Most recently 
the Hazara were dominated by the Taliban, who have been accused of atrocious acts 
towards the Hazara including the slaughter of hundreds of Shi’ite in one Hazara village in 
1998. This particular event led to rising tensions between Iran and the Taliban regime.30  
The Hazara also served as an integral part of the Northern Alliance. Against the 
Taliban, they allied themselves with the Tajiks and other ethnic groups who are primarily 
located north of the Hindu Kush. They were one of the last groups maintaining resistance 
to the Taliban tyranny, but now that a new regime has taken power they find themselves 
treated slightly better than before. While Tajiks rose to powerful positions in the new 
government and Afghan National Army, the Hazara are still discriminated against by 
many.31 
The Nuristani occupy a very small area of Eastern Afghanistan along the 
Pakistani border known as Nuristan. Until the late 19th Century this land was known as 
Karifistan, which loosely translates to “Land of non-believers”. Until they were 
conquered by the Khans, the natives of Karifistan practiced a Vedic religion reminiscent 
of Indian and Iranian polytheistic traditions. This tradition continues to this day through 
                                                          
30 Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), 264.                                              
31 Farr, Hazara, ed. Mattar, 2nd ed. ed., Vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2004), 1014-1015.                                             
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modern day animalism, polytheism and mysticism. In recent years, Nuristan has proved 
to be an area of frequent conflict.32 
After the Soviet Invasion in 1979, a Nuristani general ordered his people to rise 
up against the Soviet presence and they did just that. In many ways, the Mujihadeen 
began in Nuristan and grew out westward. During the early years of Operation Enduring 
Freedom Nuristan was, once again, a central location of Afghan resistance. In 2011, Qari 
Ziaur Rahman, a Taliban leader, claimed that any trouble in Nuristan is trouble for the 
central government of Afghanistan.33 
The Aimaq people of western Afghanistan are the only ethnic group of 
Afghanistan to show outward signs of Mongolian ancestry. The Aimaq are a nomadic 
people residing primarily in a small region north of Heart. There are less than 1 million 
Aimaq in Afghanistan, but the number that self-identify as Aimaq are even fewer. Only 
one subset of Aimaq, with heavy mongoloid features and yurt like living quarters self-
identify as Aimaq. The remainder view themselves as a part of the Hazara people. Unlike 
the Hazara, the Aimaq are Sunni Muslim, similar to the Pashtun and Tajik ethnicities. 
The Aimaq share the Dari language with the Tajik and Hazara, but it is laced with 
borrowed Turkic and Mongol words.34 
The Turkmen and Uzbek peoples of Northern Afghanistan both speak Turkik 
languages, as opposed to the Indo-European of the Pashtun. They have more in common 
with their ethnic counterparts in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan than they do with other 
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ethnic groups in Afghanistan. These Turkiks are Sunni Muslims. This gives them some 
common ground with the Tajiks and Pashtuns, but their populations are so small that they 
are traditionally inconsequential in government.35 
The Baloch live in the Southern region of Afghanistan while also inhabiting parts 
of Iran and Pakistan. The Baloch number around 250,000 in Afghanistan (8 million 
globally) and are predominantly Sunni Muslim. The Baloch speak a distinct dialect that is 
very similar to Kurdish. Just like the like the Kurdish peoples of other nations, the Baloch 
have had trouble with the central government of the state they are living in.36  
Similar to the Kurds of other nations, the Baloch of Afghanistan and Pakistan 
have advocated for their own nation-state. In the case of the Baloch, this I known as 
Balochistan. Balochistan is currently a province of southwestern Pakistan. An insurgency 
known as the Baloch Liberation Army has been present in this region since the beginning 
of the 20th century. It is not a goal of the BLA to bring parts of Afghanistan into 
Balochistan, but the Baloch of Afghanistan potentially harbor more attachment for a 
region outside of their own nation than they do for Afghanistan. The Baloch people of 
Afghanistan are relatively uninterested in Afghan politics, but their role as stakeholders 
cannot be ignored.37 
The Brahui are very closely connected to the Baloch people, separated by one 
distinction. The Brahui speak a dialect that derives from Dravidian, a language from 
Southern India. Aside from this linguistic difference, the Brahui are completely immersed 
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in Baloch culture. They are also Sunni Muslim and found primarily in Balochistan, 
Pakistan. Groups of Brahui have migrated with larger groups of Baloch into Afghanistan 
and Iran. The Brahui number under 2.5 million globally, with a majority of that number 
living in Pakistan. The presence of Brahui does not have a large impact on Afghanistan 
politics other than that there is one more group that the central government has to try and 
please. 
More than 99% of Afghanistan’s citizens identify as Muslim. The teachings of 
Mohammed entered Afghanistan over 1,200 years ago, and have been shaped by the rise 
and fall of dynasties since then. Islam in Afghanistan is different than that of other 
nations, but also Islam within Afghanistan is not uniform. Soon after the death of the 
Prophet, Islam divided into two sects that are both present in modern Afghanistan.38 
Sunni Muslims make up 85% of the Muslim population in Afghanistan. After the 
death of Mohammed, the Sunni population believed in selecting a successor (caliph) from 
a deserving member of the community. Sunni Muslims make up 90% of the world’s 
Muslim population and are generally considered to be less conservative than other 
branches of Islam.39 
 However, in Afghanistan this generalization does not hold. Sunni Muslims in 
Afghanistan made up a majority of the PDPA and the Taliban and were considered to be 
conservative. This does not align with the traditional view of Sunni Muslims and did 
created some distance between Sunni Muslims in Afghanistan. The less conservative 
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Sunnites in Afghanistan did not support the Taliban and joined with the Northern 
Alliance in opposition.40 
Shia Muslims in Afghanistan are more than 14% of the Muslim population. After 
the death of Mohammed, Shia Muslims believed that the successor of Mohammed should 
be a direct descendent of the prophet. But the Shi’ite Islam is not completely united.41 
Shia Muslims are divided into two further sects, Twelvers and Seveners. Twelver 
Shi’ites believe that there were 12 decedents of Mohammed before the line came to an 
end with the disappearance of a child. Sevener Shi’ites believe that there were only seven 
because they did not support his successor. There are citizens of Afghanistan that are not 
Muslim. There are very small Christian, Sikh and Hindu communities in areas of the 
country. Before the rule of the Taliban there was a small Jewish community, but it has 
since disbanded. All members of this community, except for one, fled to Israel. As of 
2005 there appeared to be only one Jewish man living in all of Afghanistan.42 
23.5% of Afghanistan’s population lives in an urban environment. There are five 
large urban centers in Afghanistan and all developed off the trade resulting from 
Afghanistan’s central location, agriculture, and access to water.(Palka 2004) 
 Kabul (1.5 million) is not only the Capital City, but also the country’s largest city. 
Located in the Central Province of Kabul, the city was built in a triangle shaped valley 
near the Kabul River. The city contains a large Pashtun citizenry, but has a majority of 
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Dari speaker, and as existed for more than 3,500 years. Highway 1 runs through Kabul 
and connects it to other Ring Road cities and the rest of the country.43 
 Kandahar (225,000), Afghanistan’s second largest city, is known as the cross road 
city. Located in the southeastern Kandahar province, this city lacks the manufacturing 
capacity of Kabul. Its location on roads between Kabul and Heart that also lead to Iran or 
Pakistan have built the city up into a major commercial center. Despite its commercial 
status, Kandahar remains rather bucolic and entirely reliant on local agriculture.44    
 Herat (180,000) serves as the economic center for western Afghanistan. Herat is 
the closest urban center to the Iranian border and lies in the middle of Afghanistan’s most 
fertile land. The area surrounding Herat is the most densely populated farmland in 
Afghanistan. Herat’s population is distinct from the other urban centers of the country. 
Herat contains mostly Tajik, Turkmen, and Uzbek Afghanis as opposed to the Pashtun, 
Aimaq or Dari speakers that inhabit other cities.45  
  Mazar –I Sharif (130,000) is the only urban center north of the Hindu Kush. The 
name literally translates to ‘tomb of the saint,’ in honor of the nephew who is supposedly 
buried in the city. The city is very important to Sunni Muslims, but Shia Muslims do not 
view it as a religious sanctuary. Apart from its religious import, Mazar-i Sharif is well 
known for its grain and cotton production.46  
Jalalabad (60,000) lies on the Kabul River less than 200 km from the capital city 
and less than 100 km from the Pakistani border. Jalalabad is worth noting because of its 
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population. Jalalabad is the largest city that is primarily ethnic Pashtun and Pashto 
speaking. Pashtuns are by far the largest ethnic group in the country, but they do not 
typically overwhelm in urban areas, maintaining traditional lifestyles in rural areas.47 
Afghanistan’s geography, both physical and cultural, make no two places in the 
country alike. There are dozens of language and ethnic groups and the different terrains. 
These make daily life in various areas of the country completely different. These factors 
will play a key role in not only the history of Afghanistan, but more specifically in the 
military engagements that take place there. However, because the geography of 
Afghanistan is so varied, it is unlikely that any one factor is having a dominant effect. 
Instead, it will need to be determined what is most geographically significant about the 
regions which experienced the most of these violent engagements.  
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Chapter 2: Historical Narrative 
Afghanistan has been the scene of conflict for a better part of the 20th and all of 
the 21st centuries. A majority of modern Afghanis have known only a few years of peace 
in their entire lifetimes. An understanding of this sequence of conflict is crucial to an 
understanding of what role Afghanistan’s geography has played in shaping this conflict. 
This chapter will serve as a brief survey of conflict in Afghanistan focusing on the period 
from the Soviet Invasion in 1979 to the present. The purpose is to demonstrate the 
interaction between Afghanistan’s people and its geography.  
 Throughout its history, the various ethnic groups in Afghanistan have shown a 
strong independent spirit. This continues to this day. Various empires sought control over 
the land now known as Afghanistan, but no one ruler was able to conquer the entire area. 
Neither Darius and the Persians, nor Alexander and the Macedonians, nor Genghis Khan 
and the Mongols was able to control the whole territory of present day Afghanistan. This 
trend has never truly been broken. While the modern nation state of Afghanistan has, in 
theory, controlled the entire area for decades, the amount of control it has exhibited over 
some areas was and is problematic. The modern Afghan state itself was formed in 
response to other, greater, powers fighting for dominance in Central Asia during the 19th 
Century.48 
 Both the Russian and the British Empires sought to expand into Central Asia in 
the 19th century and found themselves at odds in Afghanistan. When Russia attempted to 
annex Herat in 1863, Britain used its political and military influence to counter Russian 
expansion into Afghanistan. This resulted in the first Anglo-Afghan war. This conflict, 
                                                          
48 Hynek and Marton, State building in Afghanistan: Multinational Contributions to Reconstruction 
(Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2011), 285.                                              
28 
 
and the ones following, are not going to be evaluated in detail in this work, but they 
cannot go without mention. The first Anglo-Afghan war had no tangible or measurable 
result. “After four years of disaster, both in honor, material, and personnel, the British left 
Afghanistan as they found it, in tribal chaos.”49 
Following this war, Russian and British attempts to control Afghanistan continued 
in earnest. This resulted in the also inconclusive Second Anglo-Afghan War, and the 
establishment of ineffective treaties between the British and the Russians. These conflicts 
led to an official demarcation of Afghanistan’s borders in 1896, when a cartographic line 
was finally drawn to separate Afghanistan from Northwest British India, modern day 
Pakistan. This demarcation, dividing the ethnic Pashtuns between two nations, proved ill 
advised. For the most part, however, in the period before World War I, Afghanistan 
served as a boxing ring for the two imperial powers.50 
During World War I, Afghanistan was ruled by Habibullah Rahman, a Pashtun 
member of the Afghan royal family, but the strong British influence inhibited 
Afghanistan from exercising universal control over its foreign affairs. Despite the British 
presence, Habibullah managed to maintain Afghani neutrality during the Great War. 
After Habibullah’s murder in 1919, his son, Amanullah came to power. Amanullah was a 
staunch nationalist and disapproved of British control of any part of Afghanistan. Two 
months after taking the throne, the Amir instigated the Third Anglo-Afghan war which 
lasted for only one month due to post World War I exhaustion but, unlike earlier wars, it 
resulted in a decisive event. The Treaty of Rawalpindi freed Afghanistan to conduct its 
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own foreign affairs. With this step, Afghanistan became a fully independent state in 
1919.51 
 During the period between the World Wars, Afghanistan occupied a unique 
position as the only nation to support Muslin nationalists resisting Soviet advances. 
Amanullah viewed himself as a leader of a potential Caliphate, encompassing all of the 
Middle East and Central Asia.52 Despite the numerous ethnic groups in Afghanistan, all 
are a large majority Muslim groups by this point in history.53 However, these dreams 
were crushed by the Soviet annexation of Khiva and Bukhara, two emirates that declared 
independence from the USSR, but were subsequently reconquered. With the demise of 
his Caliphate dream, Amanullah turned his focus inward, and promoted rapid 
modernization in Afghanistan. To his dismay, his push for Westernization was not 
appreciated by the entire Afghanistan populace.54 55 
 Amanullah’s attempts to modernize, and simultaneously westernize, Afghanistan 
alienated many rural communities. Resentment towards the central government in Kabul 
reached a boiling point in the northern regions of the country which is made up of 
primarily Tajik ethnic groups and is separated from the south by the Hindu Kush 
mountain range. This will prove to be a trend in the following decades. Habibullah 
Kalakani, a warlord in the area north of Kabul and ethnic Tajik, drove Amanullah from 
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the throne only to be ousted by a Pashtun army less than a year later. This army was led 
by Mohammad Nadir Shah. Nadir Shah then established the dynasty that would rule 
Afghanistan from 1929 to 1973. Tensions between the northern and southern regions 
were not a new phenomenon and will be relevant again during the Soviet Invasion, the 
Civil War, and OEF when the North operates in opposition to the rest of the county.56 
 Afghanistan’s role in World War II was very limited. Zahir Shah, son of Nadir 
Shah, declared Afghanistan neutrality in 1940. After the end of the war in 1945, King 
Zahir appointed his cousin, Mohammed Daoud Khan, to the role of Prime Minister. In 
effect, Zahir gave Daoud complete control and responsibility in running the state. Daoud 
encouraged very close ties with the USSR. During his time as Prime Minister, Daoud 
extended a previously established treaty of nonaggression and friendship and created very 
favorable trade relationships for Afghanistan with the USSR. Many considered Daoud’s 
time a golden age. Unfortunately, it was cut short when his foreign relations skills failed 
him in his dealings with Pakistan, Afghanistan’s neighbor to the east that would not be 
ignored.57  
 While relations with the USSR continued to grow stronger, Daoud’s relations 
with Pakistan were seriously strained from 1953-63. Up to this point, because of the 
shared Pashtun identity between many Pakistani and Afghani citizens, Afghanistan had 
been offering citizenship to any Pakistani national who wanted residency in Afghanistan. 
Afghanistan discontinued its offer of residency to any Pakistan national who wanted to 
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move across the border increasing the discord between the two nations. There were also 
skirmishes between Afghan and Pakistan forces on both sides of the border in 1960. 
Tensions rose so high that embassies and consulates in both countries were closed. 
Daoud’s inability to resolve the conflicts resulted in him stepping down from his position 
of Prime Minister in 1963. Within months of his resignation, King Zahir was able to 
reopen communications with Pakistan and the border was open once again.58 
 After ousting Daoud from his role as Prime Minister, King Zahir praised 
Mohammed Yousef, a minor bureaucrat, to the post. Yousef’s tenure was short lived, but 
he did assist in the writing of a new constitution for the Afghanistan Government. The 
1964 Constitution was in effect for little over 10 years, but did have one interesting 
feature. Members of the royal family were legally no longer allowed to serve as Prime 
Minister, as a member of Parliament, or as a member of the Supreme Court. King Zahir 
stated that it was time for the educated elite of Afghanistan to come into their own and to 
serve as the leaders of Afghanistan.59  
  The educated elite of Afghanistan were ready to answer King Zahir’s call and the 
communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) quickly began to take 
shape under Nu Mohammed Taraki and Babrak Karmal. This communist party gained 
popularity with the university students in Kabul. However, in 1967, the two communist 
leaders divided it into two hostile factions: The Khalqis under Taraki and the Parchamis 
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under Babrak.60 Initially the divide between the two groups had no geographic basis, but 
it prevented the party from being effective for the next decade despite the members being 
primarily from the same ethnic group. In the meantime, Daoud Kahn returned to the 
political scene in an almost bloodless coup resulting in the exile of King Zahir and the 
establishment of the Afghanistan Republic.61 
 The Kremlin was originally pleased with the outcome of Daoud’s coup. Daoud 
had always supported a closer relationship with the USSR and the Soviets had no reason 
to believe it would be any different this time around.  The Soviets assumed that Daoud 
would function primarily as a figure head for a Soviet puppet government. What they did 
not take into account was how much Daoud had changed since his first decade in power. 
After gaining control of the government, Daoud forced over 150 Parchami educated 
youth into the countryside to prevent them from opposing his rule; distributing politically 
active people from centralized urban locations to the less hostile rural environments. He 
also removed many leftist advocates from their government positions. These moves did 
not go over any better with local leftists than it did with Soviets and also enabled future 
resistance groups to build a rural presence with the aid of the distributed Parchami 
youth.62  
 In reaction to Daoud’s domestic and foreign policies, the Parchami and Khalq 
factions reunited to reform the PDPA. After the assassination of Mir Akbar Khyber, a 
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strong Parchami advocate of the PDPA, the party reacted by blaming the American CIA. 
The PDPA took to the streets and held a massive demonstration of over 10,000 people. 
Daoud feared the power of this gathering and moved to arrest leftist PDPA leaders. In 
hindsight, Daoud either moved too early or did not move swiftly enough – because his 
attempt to undermine the power of the PDPA resulted in his own death one day later. The 
PDPA, who came to power with avid members located throughout the country rather than 
just in the cities, were firm supporters of the Soviets and it was understood by all that the 
Soviet influence in the country would begin growing at an exponential rate.63  
 While it seemed at first that the PDPA power was equally divided between the 
Khalq and Parchami, the balance soon shifted in favor of Taqari and the Khalq. Parchami 
officers were removed from their positions and Taqari was in full control as Prime 
Minister. This sort of infighting among traditional Pashtun communities was never 
uncommon, and it is of no surprise that it drifted to the political scene. However, Taqari’s 
radical policies soon lost him the support of the rest of the PDPA. These policies included 
replacing the green national flag with a red one (green being a traditional color of Islam), 
land reforms, credit reforms, marriage reforms, and mandatory education for both sexes. 
The Parchami were forced out of the PDPA and many did not like that his policies were 
drifting away from traditional Islamic practices. As unrest turned towards potential 
rebellion, it is no surprise that the USSR began supporting Babrak and the Parchami.64 
 In response to waning Khalq popularity, Taraki made a decision to nominally 
transfer the head of state position to Habibullah Amin, a fellow Kalq. Taraki hoped to use 
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Amin as a scapegoat and blame the unpopular ties with the Soviets on the new premier. 
Taraki attempted to have Amin assassinated, but it resulted in his own arrest and death in 
the autumn of 1979. The death of Taraki at the hands of another Kalq further subdivided 
the PDPA.65  
 Amin’s actions following the death of Taraki did not fully satisfy Soviet wishes. 
With growing rumors of cooperation with Iran and Pakistan, and more and more Western 
aid flowing into the country, the Soviets realized that it was time to act. In late-December 
1979, Soviet forces entered Afghanistan and assassinated Amin. By the end of the 
calendar year, Amin and his entourage were completely eradicated. While many of 
Amin’s policies had been of questionable morality and legality, it cannot be denied that 
Amin resisted Soviet control over Afghanistan. The USSR recognized that Amin would 
not compromise and decided to eliminate him and replace him with a familiar face in 
Afghanistan politics: Babrak Karmal, founder of the PDPA and leader of the Parchami 
faction. Karmal found himself at the helm of a country naturally divided physically and 
culturally and even further divided by Daoud’s forced diaspora of the Parcharmi. Karmal 
ultimately failed to unite the country, and the increased Soviet presence only added to the 
tension and the determination of resistance movements.66 
 Despite their familiarity with Babrak, the Afghan population knew that his regime 
was a puppet government for the Soviets. The nationwide unrest with the Kalq rule under 
Taraki and Amin now shifted to disapproval of the Soviet supported Parchami. Violent 
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resistance first developed in Nuristan, at this time not a province but a region of northern 
Kunar Province, but the heaviest fighting actually took place in 5 different provinces. In 
point of fact, the Soviets never gained full control Nuristan or Hazarajat. Violent 
uprisings in the cities of Qandahar, Herat, and Jalalabad resulted in periods of time with 
no government control. Mujihadeen, which means Holy Warrior and, was the term used 
to describe the resistance to the Soviet invasion. They successfully utilized guerilla 
tactics out of the North Eastern Hindu Kush mountains. At one point the Mujihadeen 
controlled 75% of the rural territory of Afghanistan. From 1981-1983, the urban and rural 
areas were under the control of the Soviet friendly government and Mujihadeen 
respectively.67  
 In 1983, the Soviets shifted their military tactics to focus more on air power. 
Soviet forces began bombing villages and depopulating areas that supported the 
Mujihadeen. From 1984-1986, the Soviets supplemented this air strategy with large scale 
ground offensives, especially in Panjshir Valley, Herat, and Qandahar. Despite the 
statistical success of these raids (Afghani casualties far outweighed Soviet losses) it is 
difficult to describe any of these operations as successful; these operations were 
completely ineffective in eradicating the resistance to Soviet power in Afghanistan. 
Instead it mostly likely contributed to its vigor.68   
 Immediately after its formation, the Mujihadeen began receiving aid from the 
United States. The U.S. provided weapons, technology, and supplies to the Mujihadeen in 
their efforts to stifle the growth of the Soviet Union. Most of this aid came through the 
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U.S. CIA. After years of failed attempts to expel the Soviet presence by the Mujihadeen, 
the U.S. decided to increase the fire power of those they assisted. In 1986, the US began 
sending FIM-92 missiles, also known as Stingers, to Afghanistan. The Stinger is a 
portable surface to air missile. After the introduction of this weapon, Mujihadeen 
resistance shifted to more roadside attacks, and Parwan Province, home to the Salang 
Tunnel, began experiencing more military engagements.69 
 By 1986 the Soviets were looking for a new strategy to suppress opposition in 
Afghanistan. They decided to replace Babrak with a pure Pashtun, Mohammad 
Najibullah, a distant relative of the formerly royal Amanullah line and former chief of the 
Afghanistan Secret Police. Najibullah attempted to declare a ceasefire in 1987, but to no 
avail. He then tried to form a “National reconciliation” government, only to fail, just as 
Babrak had before him.70  
Similar to the plight of the national government, the resistance found itself unable 
to unify into one force. This resulted in a balance between the two splintered resistance 
groups, neither of which had control over the country, controlled by different ethnic 
groups (Tajiks and Pashtun). Lack of progress and increased American pressure led to the 
Soviets agreeing to leave the nation over the next nine months on April 14, 1988. 
Fighting continued for the remainder of the year, but Soviet troops were officially 
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withdrawn from Afghanistan by February of 1989, leaving Najibullah with little political 
or military support to retain his power.71  
 The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan did not end the conflict, but 
simply shifted it from a conflict between an invading force and a resistance force, to a 
full-fledged Civil War. The Mujihadeen did not back down after Soviet forces withdrew. 
They viewed the Najibullah regime as invalid. After all, it had been put in place by the 
Soviets. The Mujihadeen sought control just as fervently as they had before 1989. Soviet 
supplies, missiles and other weapons were airlifted to Najibullah and enabled the 
National Military to survive until April of 1992. The Mujihadeen attempted to shift from 
guerilla tactics to traditional warfare immediately after the Soviets forces evacuated out 
of the country, but they moved too early and were soundly defeated by Najibullah. This 
and the lack of a unified front on behalf of the Mujihadeen prevented the resistance 
forces from quickly replacing the communist government established by the Soviets.72 
In early 1991, the American and Soviet superpowers mutually agreed to cut off all 
military aid to Afghanistan by the beginning of 1992. Along with reduced military aid, 
the USSR began to tighten its restrictions on economic aid to the country. However, these 
aid restrictions were merely a symptom of a larger problem: the demise of the USSR. 
With Gorbachev’s resignation in December of 1991, the question of whether Najibullah’s 
government would fall became a question of when Najibullah’s government would fall.73 
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After a coup attempt in February of 1992, Najibullah agreed to step aside in favor 
of an UN-sponsored multiparty interim government. The interim government was 
eventually led by Buhanuddin Rabbani, one of the earliest leaders of the Mujihadeen. It 
was intended that Rabbani would step down in October 1992, either for national elections 
or to allow a representative body to assume power. However, as was often the case, 
Rabbani refused to step down and was elected president by a body of his supporters in 
December 1992.74  
Rabbani’s chief rival, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of a Pashtun dominated party, 
convened a council of party leaders in Islamabad and it was decided that Rabbani would 
be permitted to serve out his term. Hekmatyar would serve as prime minister and the 
military would be turned over to sixteen member council. Hekmatyar was sworn in as 
prime minister in June 1992, but never convened a single cabinet meeting. Despite the 
new agreement, violence between the different Mujihadeen groups continued, especially 
in Northern Afghanistan. Hekmatyar focused on shelling Kabul with his own forces 
rather than serving as prime minister.75  
The competition within Kabul between 1992 and 1994 caused serious divisions in 
the city itself. Different parties of the Mujihadeen controlled different areas of the city. 
Kabul had been relatively untouched by the previous conflicts, but now it was center 
stage. Northern minorities controlled the city center and northeastern quarter and 
Pashtuns controlled the high ground and suburbs surrounding Kabul. Other cities 
throughout the country did not experience the internal division of Kabul, but all of the 
cities were ruled by various groups separate from the national government. This 
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fragmentation set the perfect stage for the rise of a new power that could promise stability 
and an end to the war. The Taliban was ready to answer this call.76  
The Taliban, a group of religious intellectuals focusing on Muslim 
fundamentalism, rose in the southeast attempting to stabilize the local region. However, 
Taliban culture led them try and conquer the entire country. By March 1995, the Taliban 
controlled more than 1/3 of Afghanistan.  The Taliban was briefly pushed back from the 
area surrounding Kabul, allowing the city to exit siege mode for the first time in years. 
The Taliban was finally able to take the capital in September 1996. At this point, the 
Taliban controlled Kabul and the surrounding area, but found themselves unable to 
control the Salang Tunnel, the main connection between the southern and northern 
regions of the country. In fact, the tunnel had been blasted shut by the opposition in late 
1996. It was not until May of 1997 that they were able to reopen the tunnel and push 
forward.  
At this point, a popular uprising against the Taliban incursion on their own 
territory led to a significant defeat for Taliban forces in years, losing over 4000 troops, 
but this loss would not deter the Taliban from its ultimate goal. 77 
In 1998 the Taliban pushed eastward again, taking Afghanistan town by town. It 
was reported that more than 8000 noncombatants were killed in the two cities of 
Siberghan and Maza-i-Sharif. With the fall of these two cities, Autumn of 1998 saw the 
Taliban controlling over 90% of Afghanistan with only one major opponent named 
Ahmad Shah Massoud in northern Afghanistan. The situation in the northern territory 
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remained fluid for several years to come. Those still resisting in the north, mostly Tajiks, 
Uzbeks and other Pashtuns, united under Massoud into the Northern Alliance. They had 
one goal, to push back the Taliban before fighting each other again. This resistance was 
the main opposition to the Taliban and were the reason the Taliban never had control of 
the entire nation. 
The opposition in the north under Massoud refused to relinquish control of the 
plains north of Kabul. These planes were the only area south of the Hindu Kush the north 
had immediate access to via the Salang Tunnel. The north was continually pushing back 
and forth with the Taliban government in Kabul. During this time, the Taliban 
implemented sharia law throughout the entire country. This unilateral proclamation 
failed to account for the different tribal and legal systems throughout the country and 
generated more resentment of the Taliban regime. While sharia law would fit naturally 
into legal systems of some groups, others found it oppressive and strange. Some groups 
that still practiced ancient religions alongside Islam found their beliefs outlawed and 
punishable by death.78 
Ethnic crimes committed by the Taliban and the drastically increased production 
of opium was drawing attention to Afghanistan by other nations. These factors, combined 
with the re-appearance of Osama bin Laden, wanted for attacks on Americans in Saudi 
Arabia, in Afghanistan led the UN to impose sanctions in November 1999. Unfortunately, 
sanctions had little effect on the Taliban’s policies or methods. The Taliban began 
implementing a scorched earth policy on the northern planes in early 2000, pushing 
Uzbeks and other ethnic minorities out of the north into other parts of the country and 
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creating an even greater division along ethnic lines. Over 160,000 refugees fled to the 
Panjshir Valley and another 70,000 moved to Kabul or other southern cities.79 
By 2001, the Taliban controlled as much as 97% of the country, and the forces 
opposing them in the north were waning in numbers and quickly decentralizing. Contrary 
to popular belief, the Taliban never controlled 100% of Afghanistan. They had come 
closer to unilateral control than any other group in almost a century, but they were not 
quite there. The terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, and the international response 
to those attacks, prevented the Taliban from fully accomplishing its goals. However, 
despite their lack of complete control and short-lived dynasty, the impact of Taliban 
support and the impact of its social/religious policies cannot be ignored.80  
On September 11th, 2001 al Qaeda, under the direction of Osama bin Laden 
executed a terrorist attack on United States territory. Within two weeks, the Authorization 
of the Use of Military Force was passed by United States Congress and signed into law 
by President Eugene W. Bush. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) began soon after. The 
goals of OEF were to destroy al Qaeda and their affiliate organizations and to ensure that 
Afghanistan would no longer be a safe haven for terrorists. 
The invading forces immediately allied themselves with the Northern Alliance. 
Their combined forces swept towards Mazar-e Sharif and the rest of the country. The 
Taliban fled from Kabul in November of 2001. They retreated back to their region of 
origin in Qandahar Province. Qandahar City was the last city to fall to the American 
coalition in December of 2001. After this, Afghanistan was considered to be “liberated” 
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and the Northern Alliance was officially installed in Kabul to establish a new government 
for the country.81 
The coalition in Afghanistan would not actually fight many extended battles 
during its initial occupation. An exception was Operation Anaconda in the Tora Bora 
Mountains of  Nangahar Province. The Taliban forces that were expelled from Qandahar 
fled to the Tora Bora Mountains. Between March 2nd and 19th, 2002 coalition forces 
attempted to exterminate a pocket of al Qaeda forces discovered in a valley. While the 
U.S. and its allied forces underestimated the Afghan forces, the operation was an overall 
success. This was the only traditional battle of Operation Enduring Freedom, other 
conflicts are fought much more of a guerrilla style.82 
 After the fall of the Taliban, a new government needed to be established for 
Afghanistan. The United Nations called a conference in Bonn, Germany. There were 
representatives from all nations in the Western coalition, Pakistan, Iran, the Northern 
Alliance, and even the ousted royal family. The resulting Bonn Agreement called for a 
Loya Jirga (a traditional Pashtun tribal council) to establish a provisional government, 
and the establishment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).83 This force 
included of troops from 48 nations to assist the new government in retaining its power. 
Upon its conception, the Americans refused to participate in the ISAF believing it would 
inhibit their ability to stabilize the country. During this time, its jurisdiction would be 
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limited to Kabul and surrounding areas, leaving warlords free to do as they wished in the 
outlying regions.84   
 The Loya Jirga called to establish the provisional government was structured by 
the Bonn Agreement. It was originally supposed to be composed of only 1450 members, 
but was eventually increased to 1600. Representatives from all constituencies were 
elected to attend the meeting. This included different minority groups within Afghanistan, 
geographic regions, displaced populations, and even refugee populations outside of the 
country. Women were guaranteed at least 100 seats on the council by the agreement. The 
Loya Jirga was held in June 2002 in Kabul. There were many independent candidates 
seeking control of the provisional government, but international and factional pressure 
pushed for Hamid Karzaitake the seat. The Loya Jirga was an attempt to unite and gather 
input from all ethnic groups within Afghanistan. However, the Loya Jirga is a Pasthun 
concept and ultimately proved to only benefit the Pashtun people.85  
Many Pashtun nationalists were upset when they learned that a member of the 
former Pashtun royal family was pressured to step aside and support Karzai by U.S. 
interests. 
Beyond the election of Karzai, they failed to provide any structure to the interim 
administration. According to Afghanistan scholar, Larry Goodson, the Loya Jirga 
succeeded at showing the rest of the world that “most power still lies with the strongmen, 
that ethnic rivalries continue to smolder, and that questions of governmental structure are 
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highly intractable.”86 The decisions of this body were only temporary as the Bonn 
Agreement called for the meeting of another Loya Jirga within 18 months of the 
conclusion of first to establish a new Afghanistan Constitution.87 
  The Constitutional Loya Jirga did not meet until December of 2003. Exactly 18 
months after the close of the first Loya Jirga. The Loya Jirga did not meet to craft a new 
constitution. Instead, it met to consider a proposed constitution written by one of Karzai’s 
vice presidents. This Loya Jirga delegation was made up of 504 people, some appointed 
directly by Karzai, others elected at either a district or provincial level. The convention, 
originally planned to last 10 days, did not ratify the new constitution until January 2004. 
This new constitution called for the creation of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and 
elections to be held for a president and national assembly in October 2004. Islam was 
made the state religion and no laws can be created that contradict the laws of Islam. The 
elections held in October elected Hamid Karzai to a five year term as Afghanistan’s 
president. The creation of an Islamic Republic aimed to unite the country under the 
closest thing it has to a universal geographic trait, its religion. However the unifying pull 
of Islam was not able to outweigh the separating pulls of every other aspect of 
Afghanistan’s geography.88  
 During the Loya Jirga process and the election of Karzai, the ISAF expanded the 
role it played in national security. To increase self-sufficiency and decrease reliance on 
foreign troops, many NATO countries wanted to increase ISAF jurisdiction. Originally 
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ISAF only had jurisdiction within 50 miles of Kabul. While some countries hoped to 
expunge this limitation, the United States opposed expanding the power of ISAF and 
vetoed the move, but soon realized there was no other option and the ISAF’s jurisdiction 
was expanded to the entire country. In 2003, NATO gave ISAF command over the 
previously German-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in northern Afghanistan 
and called for the establishment of addition PRTs in the region. By 2004, ISAF was 
maintaining security in the nine northern provinces of Afghanistan. Northern Afghanistan 
was the quickest to cooperate with the ISAF as they saw any change from Taliban 
government to be a positive one.89  
 In early 2005, before the official election of Karzai, NATO announced the 
expansion of ISAF into the western region of Afghanistan, a region experiencing 
relatively little conflict. ISAF began operating in Herat and Farah, and soon expanded to 
the capital of the Baghdis province. With this expansion, ISAF was providing security 
assistance to 50% of the country. In mid-2006, ISAF moved into southern Afghanistan, 
taking control of PRTs from American forces. With this expansion, ISAFs forces doubled 
from 10,000 to 20,000. In October 2006, ISAF finally took control of security in the 
entire country by assuming control of PRTs in the western region. In this process, ISAF 
began in the areas experiencing the least violent incidents and gradually incorporated the 
areas experiencing the most. However, the ISAF was not the only force operating in the 
country in terms of peace keeping.90 
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 When nations gathered in Bonn Germany and agreed on the terms of the Loya 
Jirga, they also agreed on how to divide up the peace keeping efforts between each other. 
Germany would develop the Afghanistan National Police, Italy would reform the judicial 
system, the United Kingdom would focus on antinarcotics, Japan would aim to disarm 
regional warlords, and the United States would build up the Afghanistan National Army 
(ANA). The effort to build up the ANA did not begin until 2003, and it was a slow 
process at first. Original goals called for a force of 70,000 soldiers, but western and 
Afghani experts knew the ANA would need to be at least 200,000 strong to maintain 
security over the entire country. 
 After initial recruiting failures and high AWOL rates, the ANA was beginning to 
be viewed as a success story by 2005. In 2008 the force was expanded from 70,000 to 
122,000 personnel. Opposition to the foreign presence and the Karzai regime rallied 
around the remnants of the Taliban in the border region with Pakistan. Unofficial and 
covert support from the Pakistan ISI flowed to the Taliban and al Qaeda, encouraging 
their attacks on the Coalition forces. ISAF and ANA forces worked together to eradicate 
this resistance.91 
 In 2007, the Netherlands became the first Coalition nation to pull out all of their 
troops from Operation Enduring Freedom. American President Eugene W. Bush called 
for NATO countries to increase their support in the region, but received little support. 
After winning the 2008 United States election, new President Barack Obama, pledged a 
surge of 30,000 troops to Afghanistan to assist in stabilization. These troops arrived in 
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2010, increasing the US troop presence to almost 100,000. On May 3rd 2011, United 
States’ forces succeeded in assassinating Osama bin Laden in a compound in Pakistan. 
This operation strained the relationship between Pakistan and the United States even 
more than it had been since the beginning of the conflict.92  
 After the death of bin Laden, President Obama announced that the surge troops of 
2010 would all be removed from Afghanistan by 2014 at the latest. He later amended this 
date to 2013. Out of fear of a Taliban revival, leaders of the former Northern Alliance 
banded together once again to oppose a Pashtun state. Ahmad Zia Massoud, Tajik and 
brother of the assassinated former leader of the Northern Alliance, stated that the 
Afghanis who had assisted in the ousting of the Taliban were currently ignored by the 
United States and Karzai. Masoud united with leaders of both the Hazara and Uzbek 
ethnicities to form the National Front of Afghanistan.  
This group met in Berlin, Germany and called for a reform of the constitution. 
They wanted to replace the current system with a true parliamentary democracy that 
granted more power to elected provincial governors. The NFA still holds military power 
in Afghanistan and fears militant action by the Taliban after foreign troop withdrawals in 
2014. The NFA hopes to run a candidate in the 2014 presidential election in direct 
opposition to any Taliban friendly candidate.93 
 At the end of 2013 the international military presence was declining in 
Afghanistan. In 2014, all remaining nations of the coalition plan to remove troops from 
Afghanistan, leaving small groups to assist the ANA in a strictly advisory capacity. The 
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ANA currently stands 200,000 strong, but they are untested veterans. The next year will 
decide the direction that Afghanistan continues to head in the near future.94 
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Chapter 3: Comparative Analysis 
 Chapters 1 and 2 provided the background information necessary for 
understanding any impact the geography of Afghanistan has had on conflict during the 
Soviet War and Operation Enduring Freedom. In order to identify this impact and further 
analyze it, this chapter will identify the provinces to experience 50% of the recorded 
violent incidents during each conflict and aim to identify the geographic features within 
each province that contributed the most to this conflict. 
The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and Operation Enduring Freedom following 
9/11 were similar conflicts. Both involved a foreign superpower toppling a regime in 
Afghanistan to replace it with one more sympathetic to its own goal. In both cases a 
resistance force rose to meet the challenge and executed nontraditional military activities 
against the foreign power. Both of these non-state forces had assistance from other 
nations. Over the past 30 years, there has been one constant other than conflict in 
Afghanistan: its geography. The terrain of the country has not changed. There have been 
no great genocides and ethnic groups remain where they have been for centuries. The 
country’s land use, development, and infrastructure have stayed the same. This is largely 
due to the halt in development brought on by the Afghan Civil War and Taliban rule 
during the 1990s.  
While other countries like Japan and China experienced an economic boom in the 
1990s, Afghanistan found itself treading water. But this stagnation provides a unique 
opportunity for the study of conflict. The Soviet Invasion and Operation Enduring 
Freedom can be examined as two similar conflicts occurring in almost identical states. 
This provides a “controlled” environment to determine if variables have a consistent or 
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inconsistent effect on such conflicts. And why not examine the most consistent of all 
these factors, the geography? By selecting the provinces that experienced the most 
violence in the two conflicts and examining their geographic similarities and differences, 
it can be determined that Afghanistan’s geography did not have a consistent impact on 
conflict, but rather that violence in Afghanistan during these two periods tended to 
congregate in areas of physical and/or cultural geographic extremes. 
During the Soviet Occupation, the Crisis and Conflict Analysis Team of the 
Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad, Pakistan published monthly reports on the 
ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. Reports were gathered from Mujihadeen sources on how 
many violent incidents occurred in each province, how many were against mobile targets, 
how many against immobile targets, and how many were initiated by Soviet-Karmal 
forces. The reports also tracked the number of incidents reported by Kabul Radio, but 
also acknowledged their propaganda-like nature. Clearly, this brings their numbers into 
question. The numbers reported by Kabul radio are drastically lower than that of the 
Mujihadeen sources and tended to focus on reports of individual criminals or political 
events.95 This analysis will focus on the numbers provided by the Mujihadeen sources. 
These numbers, while more realistic to the naked eye, should still be viewed with 
scrutiny.96 
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1 Provinces with highest rates of conflict in Soviet War 
According to Mujihadeen sources, 50% of the military engagements to occur 
during the recorded years took place in five of Afghanistan’s 29 provinces. These 
provinces were: Nangahar, Kabul, Qandahar, Paktia, and Parwan.97  
 
 
 
 
 
Apart from Qandahar, the provinces are grouped together along the Pakistan 
border and similar in size, but vary greatly in population size. Kabul and Nangrahar are 
both heavily populated, while Paktia is in the bottom half for population. Even the four 
provinces that are grouped together near the Eastern border of the country vary 
geographically and it is hard to find significant similarities, but it is in the lack of 
similarities make that these provinces are alike.98 
Kabul Province is the home to Kabul, the capital city of Afghanistan and the only 
province with more than 1 million people. According to Mujihadeen sources Kabul 
Province was the site of more than 10% of violent events during the Soviet Conflict 
between 1984 and 1987. Easily Afghanistan’s most Western and developed urban area, 
the Province has easy access to the Highway 1, a road leading east to Pakistan, and of 
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course can access Northern Afghanistan via the Salang Tunnel to the North in Parwan 
Province.  Of the 1200 incidents reported in Kabul Province during these three years, 
only 450 took place within the city of Kabul, approximately 37%.99  
Soviet officials during the war claimed that Kabul was completely immune to 
attack and even western journalists from the time support this claim. Despite these claims 
of peace and stability in the capital during Soviet Occupation, Soviet radio reported that 
over 15% of approximately 1300 violent events took place in the Province of Kabul. 
Radio sources do not specify whether these attacks took place within the city limits, but 
this at least pokes holes in the Soviet claims that Kabul City was untouched by 
Mujihadeen forces during the occupation.100  
The most notable geographic feature of Kabul province is its urbanization. This 
urbanization has had two large effects on Kabul’s human geography. Being the capital 
city, Kabul attracts people from all over country to come to live and learn. Already a 
diverse province, with members of the Tajik, Pashtun, Kuchi, and other groups, the city 
of Kabul forces these groups to live and work together. Unlike other diverse provinces, 
different ethnic groups in Kabul do not live in villages separated by Kilometers. Instead, 
until 1992 and the Afghan Civil War, ethnic groups lived in mixed neighborhoods. The 
urbanization of Kabul also means it is the only province that does not primarily rely on 
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agriculture for income and is the only province to rely a majority on trade and service 
industries. 101  
 While Kabul had the highest number of military events in the Soviet War, this 
was not the case in Operation Enduring Freedom. It has served as the command center for 
the foreign power in both conflicts, but the current actors in Afghanistan have proven 
much more able to isolate the conflict to outlying areas than the Soviets. Soviet era Kabul 
was not the oasis of peace that the occupying forces claimed because its urban geography 
would not let it be. As the representative center of the country it had no choice as to 
whether it would be a part of this conflict. This lack of geographic choice is something 
that Kabul province shares in common with its neighbor, Parwan.102 
Parwan is a small province directly North of Kabul. While it is home to a number 
of ethnic groups, its populace is primarily Dari speaking ethnic Tajiks. Similar to a 
majority of the other provinces it relies primarily on agriculture for its income and is not 
heavily urbanized. The distinguishing geographic feature of Parwan is its road structure. 
Highway 1 passes from Kabul straight through Parwan to get to Northern Afghanistan via 
the Salang Tunnel.  
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2 Ring Road (Salang Tunnel in red) 
 
The Salang Tunnel is the only major road to connect Southern Afghanistan to 
Northern Afghanistan. Completed by the Soviet Union in the 60s, the tunnel is an unlit, 
two lane, 2.6 km long road that goes beneath the Hindu Kush Mountains. If you wish to 
drive from the South to the North without using the tunnel, you must either drive west 
and go around the mountains, or drive east across the Pakistan border and use a pass there 
to traverse the mountains. The tunnel was equally important to both the Soviets and 
Mujihadeen during Soviet Occupation. The Mujihadeen hoped to regain control of the 
tunnel to expand their influence in the country and for the Soviets it was their only 
lifeline back home. 
For the Soviets, it was the most direct land route not only to Northern Afghanistan, 
but back into true Soviet Territory. The existence of this tunnel and its usefulness to both 
sides of this conflict, led the Soviets to be more aggressive in their operations in Parwan 
than in other provinces. Of the top five provinces to experience these high rates of 
Sources: Esri, USGS, NOAA
55 
 
conflict, Parwan is fifth on that list, but it is the first in the number of Soviet initiated 
attacks. The Salang Tunnel was also the home to one of the infamous events of the Soviet 
Occupation: the Salang Tunnel Fire on November 3rd, 1982.103  
The details of the fire, caused by a collision involving a Soviet oil truck, are still 
disputed. Some estimate the death toll in the hundreds, but others put it at over 2000, with 
a majority of these deaths being Afghanistan citizens and only a few hundred Soviet 
soldiers. After the fire, Afghanistan returned to a policy of only allowing traffic to go in 
one direction at a time. This policy holds to this day. The fire has never been claimed as 
an intentional act by either the Soviets or the Mujihadeen, but that people continue to use 
this tunnel in its unsafe state despite the tragedy show just how important it is. Even with 
resistance to Soviet occupation being based in the North, Parwan and the Salang Tunnel 
were not always hotbeds of conflict during the war. Before September of 1986, Parwan 
was actually experiencing the ninth most violent events.104 
It was not until the introduction of the FMI-2 Stinger missiles in September 1986 
that conflict started drifting towards Parwan. Up until that point, Parwan was not one of 
the provinces to experience the most conflict. In fact, it was ninth highest on the list. The 
use of Stingers allowed the Mujihadeen to better attack mobile targets and made attacks 
on or near the Salang Tunnel easier. After the introduction of Stingers, Parwan quickly 
moved into the top 5 of the provinces experiencing conflict. The other four were in the 
top five the entire time. While Parwan’s geography always made it an ideal target for the 
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Mujihadeen it was not until the introduction of the Stinger that the Mujihadeen had the 
capability to attack these targets effectively.105 
Both Kabul and Parwan are internal provinces with no international border, but 
the remaining three provinces that experienced the highest rates of conflict are all located 
on the Afghanistan-Pakistan Border. The easiest description of Nangarhar is that is a 
combination of Kabul and Parwan Provinces. Similar to Parwan, Nangarhar Province is 
home to one of Afghanistan’s major roads. The Kabul-Jalalabad Highway connects the 
capitals of Kabul and Nangrahar Provinces. The road passes from Jalalabad to the 
Afghanistan-Pakistan Border and eventually to the Khyber Pass, one of the main 
passages of trade for the two countries.  
The Khyber Pass is located inside the Pakistan Border and, when relations are 
friendly enough to allow transport, it is much cheaper and easier to travel east to Pakistan 
and North to Russia than to attempt the Salang Tunnel. Even today it can take days to 
travel the few hundred miles from the northern border to Kabul. Similar to Kabul, 
Nangahar has a very high percentage of its citizens making a living from trade or the 
service industry, but there are still over 50% of Nangrahar’s residents living off 
agriculture. Despite these slight similarities to Kabul, Nangrahar possesses one 
distinguishing trait.106 
 In a country of noted and endlessly commented on ethnic and linguistic diversity, 
Nangrahar is noticeably homogeneous. With 3rd highest population at the time, 
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Nangrahar is over 90% Pashtun and almost exclusively Pashto speaking despite the small 
number of Tajik and Arab minorities. This homogeneity is a rarity among Afghan 
provinces and almost makes Nangrahar more of an outlier because of its lack of ethno-
diversity.   Nangrahar’s near neighbor, Paktia, has a similar diverse make up, but the 
Pashtun dominance is not quite as obvious. In Nangrahar, other than Pashtuns there are 
multiple small groups of different ethnicities. Paktia, on the other hand, is also 90% 
Pashtun, but the remaining 10% is exclusively Tajik. While the ratio of Pashtun to non-
Pashtun is just as high, the minority groups in Paktia have more of an influence than in 
Nangrahar.107  
 Paktia’s human geography has little to distinguish it from the other provinces of 
Afghanistan, but its terrain is unlike any other. Paktia is almost 100% mountainous and 
the forests there provide a unique industry and resource for the people of Paktia that rest 
of the country lacks. The readily available lumber in Paktia is not only used by this 
province during the winter months, when days can have average high temperatures of -8 
C, but is exported to all other provinces. Timber and livestock make up a majority of the 
Paktia economy. With other provinces focusing on either horticulture or trade in its 
absence, Paktia’s industry differs greatly from that of the rest of the country due to its 
physical makeup. What made Paktia such a hotbed of conflict is not clear. It could have 
been the large number of Pashtun residents or Soviet Occupation was somehow effecting 
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the unique Paktia economy differently than other provinces, but it is clear that once again 
conflict with the Soviets was more common in an area of geographic extremes. 108 
 Having discussed the four provinces that cluster around the North Eastern 
Afghanistan-Pakistan Border that experienced a significant portion of military 
engagements, it is time to take note of the true outlier of the top five violent provinces of 
the Soviet War. Qandahar is the only province to appear on the top five for both the 
Soviet conflict and Operation Enduring Freedom. Qandahar is a large majority Pashtun, 
but does contain decent sized groups of Hazara and Balochi people. Both the Hazara and 
Balochi people are traditionally oppressed in Afghanistan. The Hazara are Shi’a Muslim 
which is in the minority Afghanistan and the Balochi people relate more strongly to the 
Kurdish peoples to the South West of Afghanistan, even speaking a dialect of Kurdish 
rather than Pashto or Dari, but despite the presence of two groups with little in common, 
Qandahar is thoroughly Pashtun. Qandahar’s ethno-diversity is intriguing but not its most 
distinguishing trait, so its physical make up must be examined. 109 
 Similar to Paktia, it is Qandahar’s physical geography that distinguishes it from 
the rest of the country. Qandahar has a very small mountainous region in the North but 
the rest of the province composed of flatlands, a majority of which is desert. Unlike 
Helmand and Nimruz to its west which are also composed of desert, Qandahar lacks a 
large natural water source to irrigate the region for large crop production, although it has 
managed to become famous for its vine crops and pomegranates. It is Qandahar City that 
links the Soviet Occupation with Operation Enduring Freedom. Qandahar City and its 
                                                          
108 Mark Bell, Afghan Agriculture Davis, [2013]).            
109 Palka, Geographic Perspectives: Afghanistan (Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2004), 104.           
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surrounding area were the birthplace of the Taliban. It was from Qandahar that the 
Taliban pushed out to the rest of the country, only unable to penetrate the northern most 
areas of the country.110 
  Qandahar City, the capital city of Qandahar province is of great cultural 
significance to the Pashtun people. Unlike the other ethnic groups of Afghanistan, the 
Pashtun are much more centralized under a complex clan and tribal system. The Loya 
Jirga system used to develop the Afghanistan constitution is a traditionally Pashtun 
concept, and the city of Qandahar is considered by some to be the Pashtun seat of power. 
Qandahar was also the birth place of the Taliban. It served as the unofficial capital of the 
Taliban Government during the 1990s when the Taliban’s hold on Kabul was not as 
strong.111 
 The prominence of Qandahar is directly tied the international prominence of 
Afghanistan going back thousands of years. Afghanistan is often referred to as the 
crossroads of the world for the role it played in Empires since before Alexander the Great. 
But this role can be more  
specifically assigned to Qandahar. Qandahar sits right on the route for trade or invasion 
to the Indian Subcontinent. Qandahar’s physically extreme environment and cultural 
significance pulled it into the conflict with the Soviets in the 80s, but it was its cultural 
extremism and ties to the past that have pulled it into the conflict with the United States 
                                                          
110 Bell, Afghan Agriculture Davis, 2013).   
111 Ibid. 
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and ISAF. However, Qandahar has not been the province to experience the most conflict 
during Operation Enduring Freedom.112 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Helmand Province, which experienced the most military engagements from 2004-
2009, has a lot in common with its Eastern neighbor, Qandahar. Their ethnic makeup is 
almost identical, with a large Pashtun majority and small contingents of oppressed 
minorities in the Hazara and Balochi peoples. Helmand has served as a Taliban 
stronghold since the U.S. invasion in 2001.113 It serves as a source of income, supplies, 
and is the most agriculturally rich part of the country. All of these facts about Helmand, 
its agriculture, the use by the Taliban, and the amount of conflict, all relate back to the 
Helmand River. It is noteworthy to examine the importance of the river. 64% of the 
                                                          
112 Joseph J. Collins, Understanding the War in Afghanistan: A Guide to the Land, the People, and the 
Conflict (New York: Sky horse publishing, 2013).          
113 WikiLeaks, "Afghanistan War Diary", 2010).        
3 Provinces with highest conflict rates in OEF 
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enemy non-ISAF initiated conflicts in Helmand Province from 2004 to 2009 took place 
within one mile of a river. This is 6% higher than the national average of 58% of conflicts 
happening within one mile of a river. This shows that not only is the Helmand River 
crucial to supporting industry in Helmand, but also attracts more conflict than other 
bodies of water in the country.114 
 The Helmand River enables Helmand Province to be the agricultural center of 
Afghanistan. In 2005, over 92% of its residents were reliant on agriculture for income. 
The only province with a greater percentage is Zabul, but where Helmand is the third 
most populated province in the country, Zabul is the fourth least populated province in 
the country. Helmand’s fruit, vegetable, and grain production already make it an 
agricultural standout among the other provinces of Afghanistan, but it is the illegal crops 
also being grown there that produce a lot of the income for the Taliban and other 
resistance groups. In 2005 41% of households in Helmand Province reported income 
from opium or opium related activities. The next highest report is in Balk Province with 
only 9% of households reporting income. In 2011, Helmand Province had over 63,300 
Hectares being used for Opium cultivation. Latest reports from Balk in 2005 show it only 
utilizing about 11,000 Hectares for Opium cultivation.115 Helmand Province, already with 
an agricultural monopoly in the country, is the biggest opium producer in the country as 
well. The highly agrarian nature of Helmand, whether legal or illegal, has made the 
province more conducive to conflict.116 
                                                          
114 Ibid 
115 Cimicweb.org. Afghanistan Census Data. https://www.cimicweb.org/Pages/newhomepage/index.html 
116 Ibid 
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 Helmand combined with Qandahar and Kunar province account for 50% of the 
enemy initiated conflict during those five years. Kunar experienced over 4000 conflicts 
during this time, only a little less than Qandahar. What is surprising about Kunar’s role in 
conflict is that it did not serve more of a battleground role during the Soviet Occupation. 
The Mujihadeen Rebellion against the Soviets actually originated in Kunar, but it is in the 
lower 50th percentile of provinces’ military engagements between 1984 and 1987.117   
 The creation of the Nuristan Province in 2001 helped ease some of the tension 
between the Pashtun and Nuristani tribes that each made up about half of the original 
Kunar province population. Before the creation of the Nuristan Province, there was often 
conflict between the two groups, but the groups would unite against a common threat as 
was demonstrated by the Soviet Invasion. After the creation of Nuristan province from 
parts of Kunar and its neighbor Laghnam, the ethnic ratio drastically shifted in favor of 
the Pashtun. After 2001, Kunar was 95% Pashto and 5% Nuristani transforming it into a 
relatively homogenous state similar to Paktia during the Soviet Occupation. This clear 
Pashtun majority created a very pro-Taliban and anti-western sentiment in the Kunar.118  
 Kunar also lies on the border of and serves as a connection to the Federally 
Administered Tribal Area of Pakistan. Villages in the FATA are known to provide shelter 
and resources to al-Qaeda fighters active in Afghanistan. Whether the FATA is willingly 
or unwillingly assisting those fighting in Afghanistan is beside the point. In more recent 
years, Nuristan has become much more violently active than its neighbor Kunar. The 
numbers are not available, but it suggests that violence in Kunar was an effort to push 
                                                          
117 WikiLeaks, "Afghanistan War Diary" 2010). 
118 Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), 264.        
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fundamentalist ideas out from the border and further into Afghanistan. But Nuristan, 
which has never been friendly to fundamentalist Islam after a forced conversation in the 
late 19th century, was not be an easy place for native Taliban fighters or foreign al Qaeda 
fighters to find support.119 
 The data obtained from the Afghanistan War Diary (AWD) is precise down to the 
specific location of the event. Because of this, OEF can be analyzed not just on a 
provincial level, but on a district level as well. The districts to experience the most 
conflict continue to support the idea that violence in Afghanistan tends to congregate in 
areas of physical or cultural geographic extremes.  
 In Qandahar, the districts to experience the most violence are Panjwayi and 
Qandahar City, with 2184 and 574 instance of enemy initiated conflict respectively. Both 
are physical distinguished by their location in desert like areas (deserts being Qandahar’s 
most distinguishing physical trait), they are even more significant culturally to the region. 
Qandahar as a province is considered to be the home of the Pashtun people, but this label 
should not be applied to the entire province but only to two specific areas. The first, in 
Panjwayi district, is considered to be spiritual homeland to the Taliban. Qandahar City, 
the second, is the city from which Pashtun leaders have ruled for centuries. The Taliban 
is primarily a Pashtun fundamentalist force and the Taliban with help from foreign 
groups such as al-Qaeda and Pakistan ISI is the face of the resistance forces in 
Afghanistan. These two areas’ cultural significance to the movement that is fighting back 
                                                          
119 Ibid. 
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against foreign occupation almost make it mandatory for them to take part in this 
conflict.120 
 Unlike Qandahar, Helmand is not culturally significant, but rather physically 
significant. Nad Ali, Nahri Sarraj, and Sangin of Helmand Province were all within the 
top five districts to experience the most enemy initiated violence. And all three lie in the 
heavily irrigated areas in the north east of Helmand province. While the Helmand river is 
valuable for its entire length throughout the province, and provides water for electrical 
and agricultural endeavors allover, it is in the north east of the province that the Helmand 
Valley Authority, modeled after the Tennessee Valley Authority, has been best able to 
irrigate the land on a wide spread scheme.121  
 District profiles provided by the Afghanistan Information Management Service 
report that all three districts have over 90% of their land irrigated, cultivated, and in 
regular use to produce not only subsistence crops but also commercial crops such as 
cotton and tobacco. Garner, the district in south eastern Helmand, is fourth on the list of 
Helmand Province districts to experience conflict and sixth on the list over all, initially 
stands out because at first look, this province is mostly desert and does not fit with the 
other districts in Helmand to experience so much violence. However, upon closer 
analysis, all of the violence in Garner all took place in the northwest along the Helmand 
River, the only irrigated and agriculturally significant part of the district. Analyzing 
Helmand on a district level shows that violence in the Province clusters toward the 
                                                          
120 Afghanistan Information Management Services, "District Profiles," (2014). 
121 Ibid. 
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irrigated areas in the north east, but even in the less fertile areas of the province, violence 
still happens where the river is source of life.122    
 The two districts that experienced the most conflict from 2004 to 2005 in Kunar 
were Dara-i-Pech and Asadabad.  With respect to Kunar, analysis must give heavy 
weight to the ethnic make-up of the conflict areas. Before the creation of Nuristan, Kunar 
was constantly plagued by conflict between the Nuristani people and Pashtun people. 
Both Dara and Asadabad are located in north east Kunar on the Nuristan Border but are 
100% Pashtun. In a province previously plagued with ethnic conflict, any administrative 
region that is completely dominated by one group is of note. The location of these two 
provinces also calls them into question. Both are on the border with Nuristan, the 
province created to ease the ethnic tensions during the Afghan Civil War. The data 
analyzed about Operation Enduring Freedom ends in 2009. It is of note that after 2009, 
violence shifted from these two regions into Nuristan, making it one of the most hotly 
contested provinces during the early 2010s. The result of an increase in Nuristani 
violence has led to a decrease of that in Kunar, but it still reflects the resonating ethnic 
tensions from previous years. A district in Kunar with 100% Pashtun population is not 
that unusual, however, a district with 100% Pashtun population on the border of a 
province primarily composed of an ethnic foe is. 
 As a whole, the provinces and districts that experienced a majority of the conflict 
in the documented years do not present one common geographic trait. High rates of 
conflict are not determined by the mountains or by the one ethnic group. Instead there 
was heavy conflict in highly urban Kabul, transportation-vital Parwan, ethnically 
                                                          
122 Ibid. 
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homogenous Nangrahar and Kunar, mountainous Paktia, desert Qandahar, and the 
breadbasket of Helmand. Other than religion and political boundaries, there are no 
obvious geographic traits to tie these areas together and push them to the frontlines of 
national conflict. But each of these provinces is an outlier in some capacity. In some way, 
each is drastically different from their neighbors. For some it is in their terrain, some it is 
their land use, and others it is in their cultural geography. Examining the conflict and 
geographic data from these two time periods has not yielded one geographic feature to 
help identify conflict heavy areas, but it has answered a question. Did geography have a 
similar effect on these two very similar conflicts? Yes. Almost 50% of the violence 
during each conflict took place in a small group of provinces composed of geographic 
extremes. 
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Conclusion 
The data gathered from the Afghanistan Reports and Afghanistan War Diary permit a 
geographic glimpse into the Soviet War and Operation Enduring Freedom. Where violent 
incidents occur reveals information about why they are happening and can help reveal 
information about the nature of not only the conflict in question, but conflict in general.  
No, there was not one geographic factor linking all these areas together. Instead each 
province proved drastically different from the next. The only thing that these provinces 
had in common was that together they made up more than 50% of violence in their 
respective wars and that they were each geographically unique. Some provinces were 
culturally homogenous while the rest of Afghanistan is amazingly diverse. Others were 
100% mountainous, while other Afghan provinces are made up of many different kinds 
of terrain. The majority of the violent events during these two conflicts took place in the 
following provinces with extreme geographic features. 
For the Soviet War: 
Province “Extreme” Geographic Feature 
Kabul Urbanization, Capital City, Ethnically and 
Linguistically Diverse 
Nangahar Clear ethnic majority and dominance, best 
route to Pakistan 
Paktia 100% Mountainous  
Parwan Salang Tunnel (only connection point 
between North and South) 
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Qandahar Almost 100% desert with no large body of 
water. 
 
For Operation Enduring Freedom: 
Province “Extreme” Geographic Feature 
Qandahar Almost 100% Desert, historical/cultural 
significance to Pashtun culture 
Helmand Helmand River, Almost 100% Agrarian 
Population, Largest Opium Producer 
Kunar 95% Percent Pashtun. Conflict concentrated 
on border with Nuristan.  
 
 During these two wars, violence occurred all over the country, but it was 
concentrated in these small areas with the above listed extreme features. These areas were 
all of great cultural or physical geographic significance in the country and the features 
that distinguished them from the provinces around them made them more conducive to 
conflict. 
Unfortunately, the data provided by the “Afghanistan Reports” reported incidents by 
province. The intention of these reports was to simply recount the sequence of events. It 
was not specifically compiled to be analyzed geographically and only supplied the 
number of violent incidents that took place in each province and basic information about 
what type of conflict occurred. Mujihadeen sources reported 10,783 incidents between 
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September of 1984 and September of 1987, but the reports did not focus on specifically 
where or why these events were happening.  
The data provided from AWD is more detailed and precise. It provides the specific 
time and location of each of the 37,383 enemy-initiated events rather than just the month 
and province in which it occurred. Analyzing this data can highlight trends within 
Operation Enduring Freedom from 2004-2009. Examples of these trends show that 
conflict, more often than not, occurs near water sources, roads, and cities. However the 
analysis that can be done on the two wars is limited by the precision of the Afghanistan 
Reports.  
 The AWD data was examined for proximity to water, roads, airfields, mineral 
deposits, urbanization, and what ethnic and language groups dominates the location of the 
event. These events examined on a small scale revealed little that was not expected. The 
events were grouped together near prominent every day features like roads and water 
sources, with about half taking place inside cities. Unfortunately, the data from the 
Afghanistan Reports could not be examined in the same way because the data provided 
fewer details. The reports revealed which provinces experienced conflict, what type of 
target was it against, who initiated it, and did it take place in a city. But the reports did 
not reveal where inside the provinces these incidents took place. Therefore, this 
information does not allow for small scale geographic analysis.  
 The limiting nature of the geographic data available about the Soviet War limits 
the information one can gain from it. Therefore, restricting the comparative analysis that 
can be done with the data provided for OEF. In regards to OEF, researchers were able to 
pick our specific points in the country that experienced more conflict than other areas. 
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They were not confined to the provincial level, but could instead work within the smaller 
district level. The ability to work with the WikiLeaks data a district level confirms that 
this conflict was occurring not only in provinces of geographic extremes, but also in the 
specific areas containing those extremes.  This district level analysis has little impact in a 
comparative analysis because of an inability to apply this same practice to the Soviet War, 
but it does prove that this method should be applied for future conflicts.  
 The immediate impact of this result is almost negligible. It seems intuitive that 
extreme conditions would be more conducive to conflict. However, this result, begins to 
prove this supposition. If there had been point specific data available from during the 
Soviet Occupation this analysis would have had more specific results, instead this data 
suggests that these trends should be analyzed further. It suggests that this data is vital to a 
true understanding of why conflict happens where it does. That this data is not made 
readily available to the academic community and is instead only available through 
institutions such as the AWD does nothing but harm to any military effort because 
analysis of this data by as many sources as possible an only have a positive impact.  
 Broad trends in data analysis are the easiest to spot. This paper has only touched 
on the potential of a trend, but that this potential even exists suggests that retrospective 
geospatial analysis of this data and future conflict data will be crucial any military 
operation. Military institutions routinely consider geography when making decisions for 
the future. They need to know the terrain for a future operation, they assess temperatures 
to determine what kind of equipment is necessary, and make sure they have people that 
speak the language of where they will be operating. Instead of using geography when 
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looking forward, military decision makers should be looking backwards with a spatial 
perspective.  
 Geographers in the service of the National Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agency and 
the different branches of the military are possibly the only ones with the information 
necessary to answer the questions that might be able to save time, money, and lives. Is 
conflict more likely to occur in areas that speak multiple languages? Is conflict more 
likely to occur at a higher elevation than a lower one? At the moment, the data is not 
available to establish trends that prove or disprove these questions, but it should be. 
According to Colonel and geographer, Eugene Palka’s, Modern Military Geography, the 
military currently only uses geography to plan future operations, but the military should 
begin to use geography in assessing past operations and see if there are any trends being 
established in real time to help make any military effort more effective and efficient.  
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Province Area (mi^2) Province Capital 
Badakhshan 18,298 Feyzabad 
Badghis 8,437 Qal’eh-ye Now 
Baghlan 6,604 Baghlan 
Balkh 4,861 Sharif 
Bamian 6,722 Bamian 
Farah 18,446 Farah 
Faryab 8,600 Meymaneh 
Ghani 9,024 Ghazni 
Ghowr 14,925 Chakcharan 
Helmand 23,866 Lashkar Gah 
Heart 23,668 Heart 
Jowzjan 7,326 Sherberghan 
Kabul 1,770 Kabul 
Kandahar 18,403 Qandahar 
Kapisa 722 Raqi 
Konar 4,045 Asadabad 
Kunduz 3,021 Konduz 
Laghman 2,783 Mehtalam 
Logar 1,796 Baraki 
Nangarhar 2,940 Jalalabad 
Nimruz 15,963 Zaranj 
Paktia 3,698 Gardeyz 
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Paktika 7,464 Zareh Sharan 
Parwan 3,628 Charikar 
Samangan 5,969 Samangan 
Sare Pol 9,856 Sare-Pol 
Takhar 4,777 Taloqan 
Uruzgan 11,308 Tarin Kowt 
Wardak 3,483 Kowt-e Ashrow 
Zabul 6,675 Qalat 
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Province Area (mi^2) Province Capital 
Badakhshan 18,298 Feyzabad 
Badghis 8,437 Qal’eh-ye Now 
Baghlan 6,604 Baghlan 
Balkh 4,861 Sharif 
Bamian 6,722 Bamian 
Farah 18,446 Farah 
Faryab 8,600 Meymaneh 
Ghani 9,024 Ghazni 
Ghowr 14,925 Chakcharan 
Helmand 23,866 Lashkar Gah 
Heart 23,668 Heart 
Jowzjan 7,326 Sherberghan 
Kabul 1,770 Kabul 
Kandahar 18,403 Qandahar 
Kapisa 722 Raqi 
Konar 4,045 Asadabad 
Kunduz 3,021 Konduz 
Laghman 2,783 Mehtalam 
Logar 1,796 Baraki 
Nangarhar 2,940 Jalalabad 
Nimruz 15,963 Zaranj 
Paktia 3,698 Gardeyz 
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Paktika 7,464 Zareh Sharan 
Parwan 3,628 Charikar 
Samangan 5,969 Samangan 
Sare Pol 9,856 Sare-Pol 
Takhar 4,777 Taloqan 
Uruzgan 11,308 Tarin Kowt 
Wardak 3,483 Kowt-e Ashrow 
Zabul 6,675 Qalat 
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Soviet War Data 
Afghanistan Population by Province in 1979123 
 
  
 
 
                                                          
123 Table 24. The Population of Afghanistan in the Late 1350s Š./1970s, According to the Nomad Survey 
of 1357 Š./1978 and the Census of 1358  
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Note: 
All of the following data was gathered from the “Afghanistan Reports” published 
by the Institute for Strategic Studies in Islamabad (ISSI). ISSI is a non-profit committed 
to analyzing conflict using all available open source intelligence. The following 
information was gathered from the “Afghanistan Reports” from September 1983 to 
September 1987. The Afghanistan Reports were published monthly and provided a total 
number of violent incidents per province for the month. Each incident was also labeled as 
inside or outside of a city and against a mobile or immobile target. The reports also 
recorded the initiator of each incident. The data was compiled into a geodatabase so that 
it can be analyzed special. This database is now available through UNC Libraries.  
 
 
Total Number of Incidents According to Mujihadeen Sources (Sept 1984- Sept 
1987)124 
 
Province Incidents              % 
Nimruz 55 1% 
Helmand 196 2% 
Quandahar 1135 11% 
Zabol 148 1% 
Ghazni 442 4% 
Paktika 218 2% 
Paktia 846 8% 
Nangarhar 1187 11% 
Kunarha 553 5% 
Badakhshan 150 1% 
Takhar 268 2%   
                                                          
124 . “Afghanistan Report, Vol. 14-42 (Islamabad, Pakistan: Islamabad Institute for Security Studies, 1984-
1987).      
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Konduz 295 3% 
Baghlan 305 3% 
Samangan 118 1% 
Balkh 269 2% 
Jowzjan 175 2% 
Faryab 299 3% 
Badghis 83 1% 
Herat 582 5% 
Farah 205 2% 
Bamian 55 1% 
Ghowr 119 1% 
Oruzgan 125 1% 
Kabol 1187 11% 
Parvan 627 6% 
Kapisa 221 2% 
Laghman 179 2% 
Lowgar 437 4% 
Vardak 284 3% 
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
Acts of Violence within vicinity* of Urban Area125 
*Vicinity is not Defined by the Afghanistan Report 
 
   
Province 
Name 
Total 
Incidents 
Urban 
Incidents 
Percent of 
Incidents that 
were Urban 
Nimruz 55 7 12.73% 
Helmand 196 27 13.78% 
Quandahar 1135 413 36.39% 
Zabol 148 33 22.30% 
Ghazni 442 54 12.22% 
Paktika 218 20 9.17% 
Paktia 846 41 4.85%   
                                                          
125 . “Afghanistan Report (Islamabad, Pakistan: Islamabad Institute for Security Studies, [1984-1987]).    
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Nangarhar 1187 55 4.63% 
Kunarha 553 39 7.05% 
Badakhshan 150 22 14.67% 
Takhar 268 34 12.69% 
Konduz 295 32 10.85% 
Baghlan 305 68 22.30% 
Samangan 118 12 10.17% 
Balkh 269 50 18.59% 
Jowzjan 175 9 5.14% 
Faryab 299 33 11.04% 
Badghis 83 22 26.51% 
Herat 582 163 28.01% 
Farah 205 30 14.63% 
Bamian 55 20 36.36% 
Ghowr 119 21 17.65% 
Oruzgan 125 16 12.80% 
Kabol 1187 437 36.82% 
Parvan 627 81 12.92% 
Kapisa 221 3 1.36% 
Laghman 179 5 2.79% 
Lowgar 437 39 8.92% 
Vardak 284 22 7.75% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Incidents initiated by Mujihadeen against Mobile Targets 
(September 1984 – September 1987)126 
 
Province 
Name 
Mobile 
Incidents 
% of Total that are 
Mobile 
Nimruz 19 34.55% 
Helmand 70 35.71% 
Quandahar 386 34.01% 
Zabol 63 42.57% 
Ghazni 178 40.27% 
Paktika 89 40.83% 
Paktia 275 32.51% 
                                                          
126 . “Afghanistan Report (Islamabad, Pakistan: Islamabad Institute for Security Studies, [1984-1987]).    
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Nangarhar 845 71.19% 
Kunarha 139 25.14% 
Badakhshan 38 25.33% 
Takhar 95 35.45% 
Konduz 79 26.78% 
Baghlan 111 36.39% 
Samangan 37 31.36% 
Balkh 83 30.86% 
Jowzjan 47 26.86% 
Faryab 107 35.79% 
Badghis 22 26.51% 
Herat 161 27.66% 
Farah 72 35.12% 
Bamian 11 20.00% 
Ghowr 48 40.34% 
Oruzgan 48 38.40% 
Kabol 360 30.33% 
Parvan 196 31.26% 
Kapisa 86 38.91% 
Laghman 61 34.08% 
Lowgar 154 35.24% 
Vardak 100 35.21% 
 
 
Incidents Initiated by Mujihadeen against Immobile 
Targets (September 1984 – September 1987)127 
   
Province Immobile 
Incidents 
Percent of Talks that 
are Immobile 
Nimruz 23 41.82% 
Helmand 87 44.39% 
Quandahar 419 36.92% 
Zabol 44 29.73% 
Ghazni 151 34.16% 
Paktika 73 33.49% 
Paktia 319 37.71% 
Nangarhar 569 47.94% 
Kunarha 223 40.33% 
Badakhshan 72 48.00% 
Takhar 73 27.24% 
Konduz 106 35.93%   
                                                          
127 . “Afghanistan Report (Islamabad, Pakistan: Islamabad Institute for Security Studies, [1984-1987]).    
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Baghlan 97 31.80% 
Samangan 51 43.22% 
Balkh 103 38.29% 
Jowzjan 81 46.29% 
Faryab 130 43.48% 
Badghis 32 38.55% 
Herat 269 46.22% 
Farah 59 28.78% 
Bamian 27 49.09% 
Ghowr 52 43.70% 
Oruzgan 65 52.00% 
Kabol 529 44.57% 
Parvan 265 42.26% 
Kapisa 96 43.44% 
Laghman 51 28.49% 
Lowgar 161 36.84% 
Vardak 70 24.65% 
 
 
 
 
Violent Incidents Initiated by Soviets According to 
Mujihadeen Sources (September 1984 – September 
1987)128 
   
Province Events Initiated 
by Soviets 
Percent of 
Total 
Nimruz 14 25.45% 
Helmand 61 31.12% 
Quandahar 395 34.80% 
Zabol 57 38.51% 
Ghazni 131 29.64% 
Paktika 73 33.49% 
Paktia 328 38.77% 
Nangarhar 407 34.29% 
Kunarha 222 40.14% 
Badakhshan 55 36.67% 
Takhar 110 41.04% 
Konduz 135 45.76% 
Baghlan 117 38.36% 
Samangan 40 33.90%   
                                                          
128 . “Afghanistan Report (Islamabad, Pakistan: Islamabad Institute for Security Studies, [1984-1987]).    
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Balkh 84 31.23% 
Jowzjan 110 62.86% 
Faryab 131 43.81% 
Badghis 33 39.76% 
Herat 172 29.55% 
Farah 74 36.10% 
Bamian 21 38.18% 
Ghowr 33 27.73% 
Oruzgan 34 27.20% 
Kabol 300 25.27% 
Parvan 227 36.20% 
Kapisa 58 26.24% 
Laghman 76 42.46% 
Lowgar 106 24.26% 
Vardak 146 51.41% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total Events Reported By Soviets (September 1984 – 
September 1987)129 
Province # Events 
Reported by 
Soviets 
% of Total Events 
Nimruz 5 0.38% 
Helmand 21 1.59% 
Quandahar 120 9.10% 
Zabol 14 1.06% 
Ghazni 26 1.97% 
Paktika 9 0.68% 
Paktia 94 7.13% 
Nangarhar 127 9.63% 
Kunarha 23 1.74% 
Badakhshan 9 0.68% 
Takhar 58 4.40% 
Konduz 45 3.41% 
Baghlan 66 5.00% 
Samangan 31 2.35%   
                                                          
129 . “Afghanistan Report (Islamabad, Pakistan: Islamabad Institute for Security Studies, [1984-1987]).    
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Balkh 43 3.26% 
Jowzjan 22 1.67% 
Faryab 55 4.17% 
Badghis 22 1.67% 
Herat 112 8.49% 
Farah 33 2.50% 
Bamian 5 0.38% 
Ghowr 9 0.68% 
Oruzgan 11 0.83% 
Kabol 204 15.47% 
Parvan 45 3.41% 
Kapisa 23 1.74% 
Laghman 18 1.36% 
Lowgar 47 3.56% 
Vardak 22 1.67% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data from Operation Enduring Freedom 
 
Number of Enemy Initiated Conflicts by Province (2004-
2009)130 
 
Province Enemy Initiated Conflicts 
Helmand 9838 
Qandahar 4620 
Kunar 4166 
Paktika 2764 
Khost 1897 
Zabul 1851 
Ghazni 1533 
Uruzgan 1365 
Maydan Wardak 1122 
Paktya 1083 
Farah 838 
Logar 765 
Kabul 730   
                                                          
130 WikiLeaks, Afghanistan War Diary, 2010).    
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Nuristan 728 
Nangarhar 596 
Kapisa 568 
Laghman 473 
Badghis 442 
Kunduz 378 
Hirat 353 
Parwan 229 
Faryab 183 
Nimroz 181 
Baghlan 177 
Balkh 134 
Ghor 76 
Badakhshan 73 
Jawzjan 47 
Takhar 40 
Bamyan 18 
Daykundi 18 
Samangan 17 
Sari Pul 17 
Panjsher 10 
 
Percent of House Holds receiving any income from Opium 
production or sale131 
   
Province Percent of Families Reporting 
Opium Income 
Helmand 41 
Balk 9 
Badaksan 7 
Orozgan 5 
DaiKundi 5 
Qandahar 4 
Nangrahar 4 
Baglan 4 
Baghlan 4 
Zabol 4 
Faryab 3 
Takar 3    
                                                          
131 Cimicweb.org. Afghanistan Census Data. https://www.cimicweb.org/Pages/newhomepage/index.html 
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Farah 2 
Gor 2 
Jowzjan 1 
Samangan 1 
Sar-e pol 1 
Kunar 1 
Paktika 1 
Logar 1 
Parwan 1 
Wardak 1 
Badgis 1 
Nuristan 1 
Kabul 0 
Herat 0 
Nimroz 0 
Kondoz 0 
Paktia 0 
Lagman 0 
Panjshir 0 
Kapisa 0 
Gazni 0 
Bamian 0 
 
  
  
  
Percentage of Conflicts within certain distance 
of Water Sources132  
  
Distance from Water 
source  
% of Enemy Initiated 
Conflicts 
.5 miles 37.5 
1 mile 58.7 
5 miles 96.2 
 
 
 
Percentage of incidents within certain distance 
from Roads133 
  
                                                          
132 Mapcruzin. 27 March 2013. Afghanistan Lakes. http://www.mapcruzin.com/free-afghanistan-lakes-
arcgis-maps-shapefiles.htm 
 
133 Afghanistan Information Management Services. Afghanistan Roads. August 2005. 
http://www.aims.org.af/services/mapping/shape_files/afghanistan/line/roads.zip 
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Distance from Roads % of Enemy Initiated 
Conflicts 
.5 miles 42.34 
1 miles 61.5 
5 miles 92.8 
 
 
  
Percentage of Incidents within certain distance 
of airfields134 
 
Distance From 
Airfield 
% of Enemy Initiated 
Conflicts 
.5 miles .6 
1 miles 1.3 
5 miles 5.7 
 
 
  
Percentage of Conflicts Taking place in Ethnic 
Group Areas 
 
Ethnic Group % of Enemy Initiated 
Conflict 
Afghans .018 
Aimaq .728 
Baloch .123 
Brahui .11 
Hazara 1.17 
Nuristani .33 
Pashtun 81.54 
Tajik 13.61 
Turkmen .44 
Uzbek 1.78 
 
 
  
Violent Incidents By Language Group Areas135 
 
Language 
Groups 
% of Total 
Incidents 
Balcohi .57%  
                                                          
134 Mapcruzin. 27 March 2013. Afghanistan Airfields. http://www.mapcruzin.com/free-afghanistan-
airfields-arcgis-maps-shapefiles.htm 
 
135 Language areas were determined using the primary language of each village. Language domination 
was assumed to the point equidistant from two villages. 
SAID. Afghanistan Provinces. June 2013. Measuring Impact of Stabilization Initiatives. 
http://usaidmisti.com/content/provinces-2013 
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Dari 6.58% 
Nuristani 0.29% 
Other 0.86% 
Pashto 88.49% 
Turkmen 0.12% 
Uzbek 0.47% 
 
  
Percentage of incidents that take place within 
or within a certain distance of irrigated 
areas136 
 
Distance from 
Irrigated Area 
% of total enemy 
initiated events 
Within 34.78 
.5miles 52.23 
1 miles 80.73 
5 miles 98.17 
 
 
  
Percent of incidents within certain distances of 
mineral deposits137 
 
Distance from Mineral 
Deposit 
% of enemy initiated 
events  
.5miles .01 
1 mile .03 
5 miles 3.08 
 
 
  
Number of Incidents by District (Confined to 
Qandahar, Helmand, and Kunar Provinces)138 
 
District Name Province 
Name 
Total 
Incidents 
Panjwayi Qandahar 2184 
Dara-i-Pech Kunar 1983 
Nad Ali Helmand 1920  
                                                          
136 Mapcruzin. 27 March 2013. Afghanistan Irrigated Areas. http://www.mapcruzin.com/free-afghanistan-
irrigated-areas-arcgis-maps-shapefiles.htm 
 
137 There did not appear to be a relationship between what mineral made up the deposit and frequency of 
conflict.  
United States Geological Survey. June 2010. Afghanistan Mineral Deposits. 
http://geocommons.com/overlays/55649 
 
138 WikiLeaks, "Afghanistan War Diary" 2010). 
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Nahri Sarraj Helmand 1761 
Sangin Helmand 1522 
Garmser Helmand 1451 
Musa Qala Helmand 832 
Naw Zad Helmand 675 
Asad abad Kunar 612 
Qandahar City Qandahar 574 
Nawa-i-Barak 
Zayi 
Helmand 511 
Kajaki Helmand 500 
Maywand Qandahar 422 
Daman Qandahar 350 
Shah Wali 
Kot 
Qandahar 347 
Nali Kunar 347 
Lashkargah Helmand 320 
Sirkanay Kunar 307 
Arghandab Qandahar 296 
Chawkay Kunar 295 
Bar Kunar Kunar 285 
Reg Helmand 245 
Narang Wa 
Badil 
Kunar 194 
Spin Boldak Qandahar 162 
Washer Helmand 137 
Khakrez Qandahar 73 
Ghorak Qandahar 49 
Khas Kunar Kunar 40 
Marwara Kunar 38 
Arghistan Qandahar 31 
Maruf Qandahar 31 
Dangam Kunar 31 
Shorabak Qandahar 21 
Chapa Dara Kunar 20 
Nurgal Kunar 14 
Bughran Helmand 12 
Reg Qandahar 4 
Disho Helmand 1 
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